

Is Nationalism Driving the Backlash Against Globalization?*

Jerry J. Min[†]

This Version: August 13, 2026
[Click Here for the Latest Version](#)

Abstract

Nationalism is a popular explanation for opposition to globalization, yet existing studies overlook its multifaceted nature. I argue that two distinct nationalist predispositions, national chauvinism and national pride, have contrasting effects on globalization preferences. National chauvinism drives opposition to globalization, whereas national pride fosters support for globalization, because they shape how individuals interpret information about globalization in different ways. I examine all known public opinion surveys that allow for the measurement of these two predispositions and globalization preferences, covering 46 developed and developing countries from 1994 to 2025. I show that individuals high in national pride but low in chauvinism are consistently more supportive of trade, inward foreign direct investment, immigration, and international organizations. Original surveys provide additional evidence for the informational mechanism.

Word Count: 9,717 (excluding abstract, footnotes, and citations)

*For helpful comments, I thank Andy Baker, Stephen Chaudoin, Christina Davis, Jeffrey Frieden, Robert Gullotti, Peter Hall, Josh Kertzer, Zorana Knezevic, Quan Li, Theo Serlin, members of the Frieden and Kertzer research groups, audiences at the International Relations Research Workshop, the Comparative Politics Research Workshop, and the Political Economy of Development Workshop at Harvard, the Reppy Institute at Cornell, MPSA 2024, ISA 2025, and APSA 2025. Ethan Miles and other staff at the Harvard Digital Lab for the Social Sciences provided valuable assistance with the two original surveys. This study has been approved by the Harvard University IRB under Protocol # IRB23-1231.

[†]Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University. jjemin@fas.harvard.edu.

1 Introduction

Is deepening globalization incompatible with a world order fundamentally organized around nation-states? A pessimistic view would point out that nationalism has long driven both elite and mass resistance to globalization. The idea that nationalism generates opposition to globalization is intuitive and longstanding. According to [Hainmueller and Hiscox \(2006\)](#), “references to the popular appeal of protectionism when linked with nationalism and xenophobia are common” in the political economy literature (p.474). As early as the 1970s, scholars of US trade politics pointed to popular nationalism as a source of demand for protectionism ([Bauer et al., 1972](#)). In a foundational empirical analysis of individual trade preferences, [Baker \(2005\)](#) notes: “I also control for *Nationalist Sentiment*, which is ... probably negatively associated with support for international trade” (p.929).

This association has also become central to a recent debate in International Political Economy (IPE) over whether economic or non-economic factors better explain individual preferences over trade and globalization. The dominant paradigm in IPE — Open Economy Politics (OEP) — has long relied on the simplifying assumption that material self-interest drives policy preferences, leading early studies to emphasize labor market position and asset ownership.¹ While this assumption helped OEP account for aggregate-level outcomes ([Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012](#)), recent research has shifted attention toward the formation of individual preferences, revealing that non-material concerns often matter just as much, if not more ([Naoi, 2020](#); [Broz et al., 2021](#)). Among the most frequently cited non-economic concerns is nationalism. A growing literature finds that nationalism or nationalist sentiments help explain attitudes toward multiple dimensions of globalization: free trade,² foreign direct investment (FDI),³ immigration,⁴ and international organizations (IOs).⁵

Multiple reviews of the literature emphasize nationalism’s role in shaping opposition to

¹See [Scheve and Slaughter \(2001b,a\)](#).

²See [O’Rourke et al. \(2001\)](#); [Rankin \(2001\)](#); [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#); [Baker \(2005\)](#); [Mansfield and Mutz \(2009\)](#); [Margalit \(2012\)](#); [Mutz and Kim \(2017\)](#); [Owen and Johnston \(2017\)](#); [Jamal and Milner \(2019\)](#); [Mutz \(2021\)](#); [Brutger and Strezhnev \(2022\)](#); [Dolan and Milner \(2023\)](#); [Kim et al. \(2023\)](#); [Lobo and Brutger \(2025\)](#).

³See [Pandya \(2010\)](#); [Kaya and Walker \(2012\)](#); [Moehlecke et al. \(2024\)](#).

⁴See [Sniderman et al. \(2004\)](#); [Sides and Citrin \(2007\)](#); [Hainmueller and Hiscox \(2007, 2010\)](#); [Hainmueller and Hopkins \(2014, 2015\)](#); [Kustov \(2021\)](#).

⁵See [Rohrschneider \(2002\)](#); [Hooghe and Marks \(2004, 2005\)](#); [Torgler \(2008\)](#); [Kaya and Walker \(2014\)](#); [Dellmuth and Tallberg \(2015\)](#); [Bearce and Scott \(2019\)](#); [Clark and Rohrschneider \(2019\)](#); [Madsen et al. \(2022\)](#).

globalization. For example, Fordham and Kleinberg (2012) note that “a wide range of authors present regression results showing that noneconomic attitudes are strong predictors of individual opinion on trade policy,” and highlight that “most of them focus on *nationalism of one kind or another*,” with “more *patriotic or chauvinistic* individuals ... more likely to support protectionist trade policies” (p. 323, emphasis added). Similarly, Margalit (2012) observes that “recent studies also note a correlation between nationalist and ethnocentric sentiments and support for trade protectionism,” while emphasizing that the key question is not whether the association exists, but whether nationalism causally drives opposition to globalization. Echoing this, Mutz and Kim (2017) write: “A number of observational studies have found nationalism predictive of anti-trade attitudes” (p. 829). Generalizing from studies focused on trade, Chilton et al. (2020) write, “One strand of this scholarship has found that economic factors — like an individual’s skill set, employment sector or asset holdings — are often highly correlated with views on trade and immigration. Another strand has found that socio-cultural factors — such as nationalism, outgroup resentment, and cosmopolitanism — are also highly correlated with views on these topics” (p. 130).

However, I contend that it remains difficult to conclude that nationalism causes opposition to globalization for two reasons. First, given its multifaceted nature, scholars have used divergent operationalizations of nationalism that emphasize different aspects, leading to inconsistent findings. Appendix Table A1 summarizes the diverse ways in which nationalism has been measured in 14 published studies of individual preferences over free trade and inward FDI. I categorize these measurements by closely examining the wording of the survey items from which they are constructed, focusing on their actual meanings and implications rather than the *de jure* labels or terminologies employed by the authors.

Most of the 14 studies in Table A1 reduce nationalism to one of three distinct components: *national chauvinism*, *national pride*, and *national identification*. National chauvinism reflects a sense of superiority and prioritization of one’s own country over others, as well as uncritical support for it (Citrin et al., 2001), such as the slogan “America First.” Studies adopting this operationalization typically rely on survey items that ask whether respondents believe their country is better than others or should be given priority in international affairs. National pride,

by contrast, does not imply superiority or exclusion. It is commonly measured through questions that ask how proud respondents are of their nationality or of specific features of their country. National identification refers to the relative salience of national identity compared to other social identities. For example, respondents may be asked whether they identify more as “American than Californian,” or “British than European.” My categorization aligns with prior literature. For instance, according to [Mutz and Kim \(2017\)](#), American nationalism is typically conceptualized either as “a belief that American citizens are more deserving than citizens of other countries” or as “a sense of patriotism or pride in one’s country or government” (p. 829).

Operationalization choices also appear to shape these studies’ findings: Studies that measure nationalism as national chauvinism consistently report that nationalism predicts opposition to trade or FDI. By contrast, studies that operationalize nationalism as national pride or national identification are more likely to find null effects or even a positive relationship between nationalism and support for trade or FDI.

A second reason why it remains difficult to conclude that nationalism drives opposition to globalization concerns the challenge of inferring causality from existing findings. Many of the studies summarized in [Table A1](#) rely on observational data from cross-sectional public opinion surveys, and their regression estimates may be confounded by factors like economic self-interest that influence both globalization preferences and nationalist sentiment ([Shayo, 2009](#)). Moreover, even when a correlation between nationalism and globalization preferences is observed, it is not clear whether this reflects a causal effect of changes in nationalism on globalization attitudes. Although some studies in [Table A1](#) employ experimental designs, they all treat nationalism as a pre-treatment moderator rather than directly manipulating it.⁶ This pattern reflects a deeper challenge: nationalism is a relatively stable predisposition that tends to persist within individuals over time and is therefore inherently difficult to manipulate experimentally ([Mutz and Kim, 2017](#)). It also raises the question of whether we can meaningfully

⁶To my knowledge, the only attempt to directly prime nationalism within the broader globalization literature is a survey experiment by [Kuo and Margalit \(2012\)](#) in the Republic of Georgia, which examines whether priming nationalism can durably affect nationalist attitudes and support for European Union accession. The study finds that priming does not produce lasting changes in nationalist attitudes and has no significant effect on support for EU accession. As [Powers \(2022\)](#) notes in a recent study on nationalism and foreign security preferences: “Experiments remain the gold standard for testing causality, but debates about nationalism primarily rely on observational data” (p. 29). Her study provides one of the first experimental designs to causally identify the effect of nationalism, specifically national chauvinism, on international conflict preferences.

speak of its “causal effects” if individuals’ nationalism rarely changes.

This paper tackles these two challenges by theorizing and testing how the three dimensions of nationalism — national chauvinism, national pride, and national identification — not only predict but also causally shape globalization preferences. I begin by distinguishing these three dimensions. I first distinguish national chauvinism and national pride — two value *predispositions* — from national identification, which refers to the relative salience of national identity regardless of value predispositions. Explaining policy preferences requires focusing on the two nationalist predispositions rather than on national identification, since a given level of national identification can be associated with contrasting value predispositions.

I argue that national pride and national chauvinism, as two nationalist predispositions, are essential but distinct components of nationalism that matter for policy preferences. While national chauvinism entails a strong belief in the superiority and priority of one’s nation over others (Citrin et al., 2001), national pride does not. Although International Relations (IR) scholars have identified national identification and chauvinism as key components of nationalism (Herrmann, 2017; Powers, 2022), national pride has received less attention.

I further argue that national chauvinism and national pride mediate how individuals perceive information about the impacts of globalization on their country, thereby shaping their policy preferences. Specifically, I hypothesize that individuals with both strong national chauvinism and national pride are more sensitive to information about the negative national impacts of globalization, including both loss in absolute terms (absolute loss) and loss relative to other nations (relative loss). In contrast, individuals with strong national pride but weak national chauvinism are less sensitive to information about absolute and relative loss, and are more persuadable by information about national gains. While previous studies suggest that chauvinism predicts opposition to globalization, I argue that strong national pride does not. Instead, a combination of high national pride and low chauvinism should predict strong support for globalization.

To test my theory, I first examine how the three dimensions of nationalism *predict* globalization preferences. My primary data source is individual-level, in-person survey data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity Module, conducted in four rounds between 1994 and 2025 across 46 countries (ISSP Research Group, 2015). I also sup-

plement this dataset with a three-wave online panel from the British Election Study (BES) in 2016. To my knowledge, these are the only two public opinion survey programs that provide measures of all three dimensions of nationalism, along with globalization preferences.⁷

Prior to the regression analysis, I validate my theoretical premise that national pride and national chauvinism are interrelated but distinct dimensions of nationalism. While the two are correlated, they exhibit distinct distributional patterns. National chauvinism is concentrated among individuals with lower income, less education, and right-leaning ideology, consistent with existing accounts of the demographic correlates of nationalism (Shayo, 2009). In contrast, national pride is associated with higher income, lower likelihood of unemployment, and similar education and ideology.

Next, regression analysis demonstrates that national pride and national chauvinism predict preferences for economic globalization (imports and foreign investment), immigration, IO power, and cultural globalization in ways consistent with my theoretical expectations. The analysis addresses potential confounding by both economic self-interest and alternative psychological predispositions. First, the regressions control for available measures of economic self-interest, including years of education, college attainment, income, occupational task routineness, and job offshorability (Owen and Johnston, 2017). I also incorporate additional data on populism and other political and social preferences from selected ISSP Citizenship Module surveys fielded simultaneously with the National Identity Module. Second, I apply several continuous-treatment weighting methods (Fong et al., 2018) to improve comparability across individuals with varying levels of national pride and chauvinism, and the results remain consistent. Taken together, this evidence casts doubt on the view that the role of nationalism is entirely endogenous to economic self-interest.

The results are highly generalizable temporally and geographically. Temporally, the respective predictive roles of national pride and chauvinism have been consistent across three decades since the mid-1990s. Even for the latest 2022–25 survey round, conducted amid the

⁷I find no comparable alternatives in the World Values Survey (1981–2020), European Values Study (1981–2017), European Social Survey (waves 1–9), Gallup World Poll, Asian Barometer, Afrobarometer, Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro, or AmericasBarometer (LAPOP). Nor do I find complete measures in the other 26 waves of the BES Internet Panels or in several well-known national surveys, including the American General Social Survey, National Annenberg Election Study, and the German Longitudinal Election Study.

rise of populist anti-globalism, tariff wars, and geopolitical tensions across many sample countries, the results remain consistent with those from earlier decades. Geographically, the results hold in most sample countries, which vary widely in development level and regime type.

Do these findings represent causal effects of nationalism? I probe the causal nature of the findings in two steps. First, I examine whether the results could imply causal effects of short-term changes in nationalism on globalization preferences. Using a panel subset of the BES data, I test whether the observed correlational relationships persist when estimating individual fixed effects models that account for all time-invariant nationalist predispositions and other stable characteristics. The analysis indicates that nationalist predispositions remain highly stable within individuals over time. Hence, the regression findings are unlikely to reflect short-term causal effects of changes in nationalism on globalization preferences.

Second, I examine the psychological microfoundations underlying my proposed causal mechanism: although the two nationalist predispositions are stable, they shape how individuals interpret information about globalization because they reflect different orientations toward intergroup hierarchy and competition. The ISSP measures neither, so I fielded two original surveys of Americans measuring both nationalist predispositions alongside social dominance orientation and zero-sum thinking; I also draw on the BES, which includes a battery on social dominance orientation. Across these three samples, national chauvinism is strongly and positively associated with social dominance orientation, while national pride is not, and the difference is large and highly significant. This divergence is also specific: the two predispositions do not differ in zero-sum thinking, which existing work would lead one to expect alongside hierarchy preference. This locates the distinction between pride and chauvinism in orientations toward national standing rather than a general competitive worldview.

This paper offers an empirical guide to operationalizing and analyzing nationalism in future research. It also provides a systematic framework for reconciling the diverse operationalizations and findings of previous studies examining the relationship between nationalism and globalization preferences. As I demonstrate in my analysis, regression estimates of nationalism's effects on globalization preferences vary significantly depending on whether nationalism is measured as a single dimension or as a combination of multiple dimensions.

This paper also has implications for the theoretical understanding of nationalism itself. I highlight the relevance of national pride to policy preferences, complementing existing theories of nationalism in IR that emphasize national chauvinism and national identification (Herrmann et al., 2009; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Herrmann, 2017; Powers, 2022). Moreover, by distinguishing national pride from national chauvinism through their demographic correlates, I find that higher household or personal income is associated with stronger national pride but weaker national chauvinism. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom in Comparative Politics that the low-income working class is more nationalist (Shayo, 2009).

2 Theory

I develop three theoretical claims. First, nationalist predispositions, not national identification, drive how nationalism predicts and affects policy preferences. Second, national chauvinism and national pride are distinct predispositions that predict and affect globalization preferences in different ways. Third, national chauvinism and national pride shape globalization preferences by mediating how individuals perceive information about the national impacts of globalization.

2.1 Identity: Identification and Predispositions

Identification and predispositions are the two core components of any social identity. Identification with a social group refers to the salience or perceived importance of that group relative to others. It is also often called “attachment” (Powers, 2022). It emerges from group comparison and self-categorization. While individuals may identify with numerous social groups — including nation, locality, race, ethnicity, gender, class, and occupation — they tend to identify with groups based on valued criteria or the group’s status, such as wealth or power (Tajfel et al., 1979). For instance, an individual may identify more strongly with their national identity than their class identity if they perceive the nation to have a higher or more desirable status (Shayo, 2009).

Predispositions refer to the values and behavioral norms that a group identity prescribes to its members. They can also be called “contents,” as in Powers (2022). Identifying with a group fosters not only attachment to the group label but also shapes how individuals learn to behave as group members. Yet predispositions vary not only across groups but also within the same

group, as individual members may selectively internalize some values and norms but not others. The distinction between *unity-based* and *equity-based* predispositions is the most fundamental variation in predispositions (Fiske, 1991; Powers, 2022). Group members who adopt unity-based norms view in-groups as superior to out-groups, perceive strong boundaries between groups, and believe they should be willing to fight to protect their in-group. Similarly, many studies in Comparative Politics have examined *ethnic nationalism* versus *civic nationalism*, another common framework for understanding variations in national identity predisposition (Miller and Ali, 2014).

In sum, national identification is the abstract degree of identification independent of any value predisposition. Thus, I expect that national identification does not predict or cause either opposition to or support for globalization once national predispositions are accounted for.

2.2 Distinct Predispositions: National Chauvinism vs. National Pride

I introduce national chauvinism and national pride as two distinct nationalist predispositions by comparing their definitions. Chauvinism is perhaps the most well-known characterization of unity-based predispositions. Citrin et al. (2001, 74) define chauvinism as a belief in the superiority and priority of one's country over others and uncritical support for the nation.⁸ IR scholars have identified national identification (or "attachment") and chauvinism as key components of nationalism (Herrmann et al., 2009; Herrmann, 2017; Powers, 2022). As Kertzer and Brutger (2016) note, "IR scholars who have studied ingroup identification tend to distinguish between national attachment and national chauvinism" (p. 240).

National pride is usually defined as the emotional attachment to the nation.⁹ Hence, individuals with strong national chauvinism often also have strong emotional national attachment

⁸While most emphasize comparison with other nations as the defining component of chauvinism, some emphasize the "uncritical" dimension: Miller and Ali (2014) treat uncritical patriotism as a separate dimension of national identity, alongside identification, pride, and civic versus ethnic nationalism; Staub (1997); Schatz et al. (1999); Parker (2010) examine critical versus uncritical, blind versus constructive patriotism.

⁹While the abovementioned self-categorization theories of social identity define group identification as a single construct (Tajfel et al., 1979; Fiske, 1991; Shayo, 2009; Powers, 2022), some scholars of American Politics and Social Psychology distinguish three types of group identification/attachment based on how it develops (Henry et al., 1999; Robinson, 2016). Affective attachment, or pride, is rooted in emotion. Ascriptive or cognitive attachment stems from perceived similarities between oneself and the group prototype. Behavioral attachment is based on the belief that the well-being of other group members affects one's own well-being, a concept commonly referred to as "linked fate" in the race and ethnic politics literature in American Politics (Dawson, 1995; Gay, 2004). Unlike cognitive and behavioral attachment to the nation, national pride has a distinct emotional component, making it especially relevant to attitudes toward foreign relations.

and national pride. However, unlike national chauvinism, national pride does not imply subjective superiority or aversion to other nations. Thus, while individuals with strong national chauvinism often also have strong national pride, the opposite is probably not true. National pride has received little attention in IR theories of nationalism — while [Herrmann \(2017\)](#) and [Powers \(2022\)](#) focus on overall national attachment as well as national chauvinism, they do not specifically address national pride.

Given their different definitions, national chauvinism and national pride do not always co-exist. On the one hand, strong national pride is often not accompanied by strong national chauvinism. Strong national pride, when not accompanied by chauvinism, is often — but not always — a manifestation of *patriotism*. Patriotism can be defined as a form of national attachment that combines emotional identification — namely pride — with a principled commitment to the nation’s values, institutions, and collective well-being ([Huddy and Khatib, 2007](#)).¹⁰ It is noteworthy that while strong national pride combined with weak chauvinism may resemble patriotism, this combination does not necessarily fulfill a civic or principled definition of patriotism — as a commitment to democratic ideals, a willingness to critically evaluate national policies, and active civic engagement ([Staub, 1997](#); [Schatz et al., 1999](#)). An individual may feel proud of their country’s cultural heritage while remaining disengaged from its political institutions or indifferent to its moral and civic obligations. Existing studies listed in Table [A1](#) have measured national pride using survey items that ask about feelings of pride, but these measures do not necessarily constitute precise measures of patriotism given its nuanced definition. Hence, this paper focuses on national pride and national chauvinism, but not on patriotism.

On the other hand, chauvinism does not always entail national pride, and individuals with strong national chauvinism do not necessarily have strong national pride. While this is counterintuitive, [Bonikowski and DiMaggio \(2016\)](#) show that in the US, a minority of chauvinists exhibit low national pride. These individuals appear disengaged from national affairs, thus harboring low national pride, while expressing aggressive resentment toward foreign countries and peoples due to underlying authoritarian personalities and dominance orientations.

¹⁰Note that, in some theoretical frameworks, my definition of patriotism corresponds to the so-called constructive or critical patriotism, while my definition of chauvinism corresponds to the so-called blind or uncritical patriotism ([Staub, 1997](#); [Schatz et al., 1999](#); [Nincic and Ramos, 2012](#)).

To sum up, national pride and national chauvinism are interrelated but distinct dimensions of nationalism, and their levels may vary within individuals, resulting in four types of nationalists. Table 1 summarizes these four types in a two-by-two framework. Some individuals exhibit both strong national chauvinism and strong national pride, while others have weak national chauvinism but strong national pride. Conversely, some individuals display strong national chauvinism but weak national pride, whereas others have both weak national chauvinism and weak national pride. The last group may consist of two types: those who are truly cosmopolitan and identify more as world citizens than as nationals, and those who are disengaged from both national and global affairs. In the context of the US, the existence of these four distinct groups has been confirmed by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), while I will verify this for a more diverse set of countries in my empirical analysis.

Table 1: Four types of nationalists by national chauvinism and national pride.

		National Chauvinism	
		Strong	Weak
National Pride	Strong	“Nationalistic”	Close to “patriotic”
	Weak	Externally aggressive & internally disengaged	Either 1) cosmopolitan, or 2) disengaged

Notes: The bottom-right cell refers to two different types of individuals: those who are highly cosmopolitan (i.e., “world citizens”), and those who are indifferent toward and detached from national identity.

2.3 Predispositions, Information, and Preferences

Existing studies in IPE and American Politics suggest the possibility that national pride does not induce opposition to globalization as national chauvinism does. As shown in Table A1, in explaining support for inward FDI, Pandya (2010) operationalizes nationalism using a survey question directly addressing national pride. While she initially expects nationalism to predict opposition to FDI, she surprisingly finds that national pride has either a positive or null relationship with support for inward FDI, depending on the survey year. She notes, “[f]or all of the reasons that trade might be an affront to nationalist sentiment, FDI should evoke even stronger opposition. The absence of a large, robust effect of nationalism on FDI preferences is notable because it disproves the common assertion that nationalism motivates opposition to FDI” (p. 404). Also, in Dolan and Milner (2023)’s survey in Ghana, they find that national

pride strongly predicts support for free trade even when measures of economic self-interest are controlled for. In American Politics, for example, [de Figueiredo Jr and Elkins](#) operationalize “patriotism” using survey questions about national pride. Their exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses demonstrate that national pride and chauvinism constitute two distinct dimensions. They further show that while chauvinism predicts opposition to immigration, national pride does not.¹¹

I emphasize an information channel through which national chauvinism induces opposition to globalization while national pride promotes support for it. Nationalism does not automatically create or determine preferences on specific and complex globalization issues such as import tariffs, FDI restrictions and incentives, or cooperation with IOs in particular issue areas. To be sure, nationalist predispositions might directly entail, or be closely entangled with, broader inclinations toward relationships with foreign nations and conflict versus peace in the world ([Powers, 2022](#)). Yet, forming preferences over specific developments in globalization and related policies requires information or knowledge. Nationalist predispositions are typically in place when such information arrives, unless an individual entirely lacks a national identity. If so, nationalist predispositions should influence how individuals absorb and utilize information, thereby shaping the formation of preferences.

I argue, first, that holding national pride constant, individuals with stronger national chauvinism are more likely to develop opposition to globalization when exposed to information about its negative impacts or risks to their nation, and less likely to develop support when presented with information about its benefits. Individuals high in national chauvinism place great weight on their nation’s perceived superiority relative to others. As a result, they should be particularly sensitive not only to *absolute* national loss from globalization but also to their nation’s *relative* loss compared to other countries, even when such relative loss is accompanied by absolute gains.

Second, holding national chauvinism constant, individuals with greater national pride are less persuadable by information about national loss from globalization and more persuadable by

¹¹They originally use the term “nationalism” to refer to “chauvinism” and “patriotism” to refer to national pride. Their typology subsumes both patriotism and nationalism under the broader concept of national identity. Many scholars in American Politics and Social Psychology operationalize “patriotism,” “constructive patriotism,” or “critical patriotism” as national pride.

information about national gains. These individuals are likely less concerned with relative loss and, as a result, are less susceptible to negative information about globalization's consequences while being more responsive to its potential benefits.

I argue that national chauvinism and national pride lead to different concerns with national gains and losses by shaping how individuals think about the status of the national in-group. Under national chauvinism, the perceived superiority of one's own group is premised on comparisons against competing groups, motivating in-group members to defend their superiority over out-groups. Such a group behavioral norm renders in-group members sensitive about potential threats to relative group status from out-group competition. In contrast, national pride is an affective attachment to group status that is not necessarily built on comparisons against competing groups, thereby downplaying sensitivity to threats and emphasizing confidence in the resilience of group status.

These dynamics of group comparison can be further substantiated by two underlying psychological microfoundations: social dominance orientation (SDO) and zero-sum thinking. SDO refers to an individual's general preference for hierarchical intergroup relations and the belief that some social groups should dominate others (Pratto et al., 2013). Zero-sum thinking refers to the belief that gains for one group necessarily come at the expense of another, such that social, political, or economic outcomes are perceived as inherently competitive (Chinoy et al., 2026). Mutz and Kim (2017) show that individuals with higher levels of SDO and stronger zero-sum beliefs exhibit greater sensitivity to relative gains and losses, prioritizing how their group fares compared to others over absolute outcomes. Consequently, information about potential national loss is especially likely to resonate with these individuals, while information about potential benefits is unlikely to persuade them unless it highlights improvements in the nation's relative standing vis-à-vis other countries.

I conjecture that national chauvinism is associated with stronger SDO and zero-sum thinking, whereas national pride is associated with weaker SDO and zero-sum thinking. Because the defining feature of national chauvinism is the belief in national superiority within the international hierarchy, individuals high in national chauvinism are especially likely to exhibit elevated SDO and stronger zero-sum beliefs. By contrast, SDO and zero-sum thinking are not

necessary for national pride, which does not require beliefs in out-group inferiority but instead reflects satisfaction with the nation as it is. Moreover, when individuals recognize that their nation's objective position in the international hierarchy is not dominant, those high in SDO and zero-sum thinking may experience this as inconsistent with their preference for hierarchical dominance, thereby dampening national pride. Accordingly, national pride should be negatively associated with SDO and zero-sum thinking.

In sum, individuals with strong national chauvinism and weak national pride are more persuadable by information about national loss from globalization but less so by information about national gains, whereas individuals with strong national pride and weak national chauvinism are less persuadable by information about national loss but more so by information about national gains.

Before summarizing my hypotheses, I further clarify my theoretical framework by discussing the relative roles of nationalism and economic self-interest. I do not assume that nationalist predispositions and economic self-interest are mutually exclusive or competing determinants of policy preferences. Instead, I treat them as parallel or even complementary factors. For example, nationalist predispositions may mediate how individuals interpret information about the effects of globalization, thereby shaping their perceptions of how their own economic interests will be affected. Conversely, significant changes in an individual's economic self-interest due to globalization shocks, such as trade-induced layoffs, may in turn shape their nationalist predispositions.

As such, my framework is similar to [Stantcheva \(2024\)](#)'s broad framework, which posits that material self-interest, predispositions (or what she calls "mindsets"), and broader concerns (i.e., sociotropic and political interests) shape individuals' policy preferences. A slight difference between my framework and that of [Stantcheva](#) is that I do not argue that nationalist predispositions have *direct* effects on specific policy preferences, whereas [Stantcheva](#) allows "mindsets" to influence preferences both directly and indirectly. I assume that a nationalist predisposition can affect individuals' preferences over a specific policy issue by mediating how they receive and interpret information about that issue.

Hypotheses

I lay out four main hypotheses to be tested:

- **H1:** National pride and national chauvinism are interrelated but distinct dimensions of nationalism.
- **H2:** National identification alone does not drive opposition to globalization.
- **H3:** National chauvinism increases opposition to globalization.
- **H4:** National pride increases support for globalization, and this positive effect is stronger when national chauvinism is weak.

3 Data and Measurement


This section introduces the main data source, the ISSP National Identity Module (ISSP Research Group, 2015), and how I operationalize the independent and dependent variables using the data. I also supplement the ISSP data with a three-wave panel from the British Election Study (BES) in 2016, which will be introduced in Section 5.3.3 following my baseline analysis of the ISSP data.

The ISSP National Identity Module focuses on national identity and attitudes toward global affairs. It is a fieldwork-based survey conducted primarily face-to-face, with an online option in a few cases. It has been implemented in four rounds, fielded between 1994 and 1996, 2002 and 2005, 2012 and 2015, and 2022 and 2025. Each round is a cross-sectional survey with no panel component. The four rounds include 168,884 responses from 120 samples across 46 unique countries. Figure 1 shows the distribution of sample countries by survey round. While the sample is more representative of advanced democracies in Western Europe and North America, it also includes many low- and middle-income countries across other continents, such as Chile, Georgia, India, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela.

3.1 Measuring Nationalism Dimensions

In each round of the ISSP National Identity Module, more than one survey item appears relevant to all three dimensions of nationalism. It is *ex ante* unclear how to use these items to construct a

Figure 1: ISSP National Identity Module sample countries by survey round.



Notes: There are 46 countries included in at least one of the four rounds: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Since some countries entered the survey more than once, the four rounds include 120 samples in total, with 168,884 responses. See Table B1 for detailed information on sample size and enumeration period.

measure for each dimension. Using every item as a separate independent variable would render the analysis infeasible, while selecting only one or a few risks biased findings. I therefore employ a dimension-reduction procedure to classify all nationalism-related items into the three dimensions, then construct two indices for each: a latent-factor index based on the first principal component of respondents' responses, and a mean-score index based on the simple average of responses.

The dimension reduction procedure proceeds as follows. First, I preliminarily sort all nationalism-related items into the three dimensions by interpreting question wordings and referencing existing studies.¹² Table 2 lists the survey items and their classifications. I then use factor analysis to refine and validate the classifications. Using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), I check whether items in each category load onto a common factor by examining whether each item is positively and substantially correlated with the first principal component

¹²For example, items matched to national chauvinism either explicitly prompt respondents to compare their country to others or ask about uncritical support for the nation, reflecting the two core elements of my definition of national chauvinism.

of that category. As shown in Table 2, most items within each category load onto the same first principal component, but a few are outliers, which I exclude from both indices. I set aside a separate battery of items providing additional measures of unity-based versus equity-based predispositions, summarized in Table B2.¹³

Table 2: Measuring nationalism dimensions using ISSP data.

Survey Item	Survey Round	Latent Factor
National Identification		
<i>I feel closer to my country than my town, region, or continent</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I feel like a citizen of my country instead of a world citizen</i>	3	✗
National Pride		
<i>I am proud of my nationality</i>	2 – 3	✓
<i>My country winning in sports makes me proud</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's democracy</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's political influence in the world</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's economic achievements</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's achievements in sports</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's achievements in arts</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's history</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's armed forces</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's scientific achievements</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's social security system</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I am proud of my country's fair treatment of all groups</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>I am often less proud of my country than I would like to be</i>	3	✓
National Chauvinism		
<i>My country is better than most other countries</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Something about my country makes me ashamed</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>I would rather be a citizen of this country than any other</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>The world would be better if others were more like us</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>People must support their country even if it is in the wrong</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>My country should pursue its interests even at the risk of conflict</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Admitting our shortcomings makes the world better</i>	3	✗

Notes: Responses were recorded on various integer scales (1 – 4, 1 – 5, 1 – 7, etc.) and reversed where necessary so that higher values consistently indicate greater national identification, pride, or chauvinism.

National identification is measured using the survey item *I feel closer to my country than my town, region, or continent*, which appears in Rounds I–III. Only two survey items are relevant to this dimension, and they do not load onto a common latent factor. The first item is similar to

¹³This battery asks respondents to evaluate various “membership criteria” for being truly part of the nation, such as being born in the country or feeling the nationality. These items have frequently been used to measure ethnic versus civic nationalism (Miller and Ali, 2014). Since the chauvinism items already capture unity-based predispositions, my baseline analysis focuses on national identification, pride, and chauvinism, while controlling for membership criteria responses in robustness checks.

those used in other survey programs to measure national identification (see Table A1). The second item, *I feel like a citizen of my country instead of a world citizen*, has a narrower meaning and appears only in Round III. I therefore use the first item as the measure for national identification. As Round IV removed this item without replacement, analyses involving national identification are restricted to Rounds I–III.

3.2 Measuring Globalization Preferences

I apply the same dimension-reduction procedure to construct measures of globalization attitudes. The ISSP surveys include multiple items on attitudes toward key dimensions of globalization, including free trade, inward FDI, immigration, and IOs. I initially categorize these items into four groups: economic globalization, immigration, IOs, and cultural globalization, as documented in Table 3. The economic globalization items are relevant to both trade and FDI.¹⁴

CFA confirms that most items load positively and substantially on their respective first principal components, with several exceptions. First, one trade-related item states *Free trade leads to better products becoming available*. Unlike the other three economic globalization items, which pit foreign and domestic capital or goods against each other, this item does not tap into such competition. Second, the three IO-related items do not form a single latent factor. The first asks whether respondents agree that IOs “are taking too much power from our government” (IO POWER).¹⁵ The second (IO ENFORCEMENT) asks whether *international bodies should enforce solutions to issues like pollution*.¹⁶ The third (IO DECISIONS) asks whether the national government *should follow IOs’ decisions despite disagreement*.¹⁷ The latter two pertain to specific IO functions rather than the general power balance between IOs and nation-states, and they do not form a distinct latent factor in CFA. I therefore use IO POWER as a primary dependent variable and treat the other two as supplementary.

Together, I have four primary dependent variables that indicate support for globalization:

¹⁴For example, “Do you agree or disagree that large international companies damage local business?” Some respondents may associate this with FDI by large international companies, while others may interpret it as referring to the sale of products by such companies.

¹⁵In Round IV (2022–25), specific IOs such as the EU were referenced depending on country membership.

¹⁶This item uses the term “international bodies” rather than “international organizations.”

¹⁷In Round IV (2022–25), specific IOs such as the EU were likewise referenced depending on country membership.

Table 3: **Measuring globalization preferences using ISSP data.**

Survey Item	Survey Round	Latent Factor
Economic Globalization		
<i>Our country should limit imports to protect national industry</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Large international companies damage local business</i>	2 – 4	✓
<i>Free trade leads to better products becoming available</i>	2 – 3	✗
Immigration		
<i>Immigrants increase crime</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Immigrants are good for the economy</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Immigrants take jobs away from natives</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Immigrants improve our society by bringing new ideas</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Increase or reduce the number of immigrants?</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants</i>	1 – 3	✓
<i>Government spends too much money assisting immigrants</i>	2	✓
<i>Immigrants undermine our culture</i>	3	✓
<i>Legal immigrants should have same rights as citizens</i>	2 – 3	✓
<i>Legal immigrants should have equal access to education</i>	3	✓
International Organizations		
IO POWER		
<i>IOs are taking too much power from our government</i>	1 – 4	✗
IO ENFORCEMENT		
<i>International bodies should enforce solutions to issues like pollution</i>	1 – 4	✗
IO DECISIONS		
<i>Our country should follow IOs' decisions despite disagreement</i>	2 – 4	✗
Cultural Globalization		
<i>Our country's TV should favor native films and programs</i>	1 – 4	✓
<i>Foreign films, music, and books damage our culture</i>	2	✓

Notes: Responses are coded 1–5; scales are reversed where necessary so that higher values consistently indicate greater support for globalization.

ECONOMIC, IMMIGRATION, IO POWER, and CULTURAL. For ECONOMIC and IMMIGRATION, I create both a latent index based on the first principal component and a mean-based index. For CULTURAL, since it only has two relevant survey items, one of which appeared in only one round, I simply use the survey item about foreign films and TV programs that appeared in all four rounds for consistency. Higher values on each variable indicate greater support for globalization.


4 Distinguishing National Pride from Chauvinism

I start my empirical analysis by testing **H1**, that national pride and national chauvinism are interrelated but distinct nationalist predispositions. **H1** implies that national pride and national chauvinism exhibit distinct distributions among respondents. I examine two observable implications: First, at any given level of national pride, there should be substantial variation in national chauvinism, and vice versa. Second, national pride and national chauvinism should correlate with distinct demographic features.

4.1 Distinct Distributions


I present descriptive statistics demonstrating that national pride and chauvinism have distinct distributions across respondents in each of the four ISSP rounds. For each round, Figure 2 reports the percentage of respondents in the four categories corresponding to the cells of Table 1: (1) both chauvinism and pride above the sample mean, (2) both below the sample mean, (3) below-mean chauvinism but above-mean pride, and (4) above-mean chauvinism but below-mean pride. Substantial proportions of respondents fall in the off-diagonal cells — those with high chauvinism but low pride (light red) and those with low chauvinism but high pride (dark blue). For instance, in Round III, about 19% of respondents had below-mean chauvinism but above-mean pride in terms of the mean scores, while about 17% had the reverse.

Figure 2: **Distribution of respondents by national pride and chauvinism in the ISSP surveys.**



Notes: The left panel uses the mean-based indices of national pride and national chauvinism, while the right panel uses the latent-factor indices. Respondents are classified into four categories based on whether their national pride and chauvinism fall above or below the sample mean.

Figure 3: **Correlations between national pride and national chauvinism in ISSP.**



I also examine the correlations between national pride and national chauvinism in Figure 3. In the ISSP data, the correlation is 0.34 and statistically significant when using the mean-score indices of national pride and chauvinism. When using the latent-factor indices, the correlation increases to 0.70, also statistically significant. The stronger correlation in the latent-factor indices likely reflects the intercorrelation between the underlying dimensions of national pride and chauvinism. This suggests that using latent-factor indices in regression requires attention to potential collinearity. Nevertheless, the much weaker correlation between the mean-score indices provides reassurance that national pride and national chauvinism have distinct distributions. Appendix Figure C1 presents correlation estimates along with histograms and scatter plots for national pride and chauvinism. Together, these findings suggest that while national pride and national chauvinism are related, they represent distinct dimensions of national identity and should not be conflated.

The correlation between national pride and national chauvinism has two consequences for the analysis that follows. First, because the two predispositions overlap, the coefficient on one holding the other constant is identified from a comparatively thin slice of variation. Therefore, each marginal coefficient can change substantially depending on whether the specification controls for the other dimension, and no single coefficient should carry the argument on its own.

Second, a claim that the two predispositions behave differently cannot be established by observing that one coefficient is statistically significant and the other is not. That comparison involves two separate tests against zero, not a test of the difference between them. Wherever the two coefficients do not have opposite signs or are not both statistically significant, I test

their contrast directly, using the coefficient covariance matrix to compute its standard error. Because this standard error will be larger than combining the two separately reported standard errors would imply, the contrast is the more demanding test, not a more convenient one.

4.2 Distinct Demographic Correlates

I now examine whether national pride and national chauvinism correlate with different demographic variables or with the same demographic variables in different ways. If they do, it would suggest that national pride and national chauvinism tend to be associated with different types of individuals and shaped by different long-term socioeconomic processes. To be sure, precisely identifying the causes of these distinct configurations is beyond the scope of this paper. I examine the following demographic variables: age, gender, years of education, college degrees, employment status, income, and left-right ideology.

Figure 4: **Demographic predictors of national chauvinism and national pride.**




Figure 4 reports results from simple OLS regressions of the nationalism dimensions on the demographic variables. The main focus is the comparison between national pride and chauvinism; the analysis for national identification is reported in Appendix Table C7. Columns (1) and (2) report results using the mean-score indices for national pride and national chauvinism. Higher household income predicts greater national pride but weaker chauvinism. More years of education and college degrees predict weaker chauvinism but not weaker pride. Right-leaning ideology predicts greater chauvinism but not greater pride. Males tend to exhibit greater chauvinism than females, as do older respondents. Columns (3) and (4) replicate the analysis using the latent-factor indices, and the discrepancies between pride and chauvinism over income, education, ideology, and gender persist. These results are robust to measuring income using personal rather than household income (see Appendix Table C8).

Table 4: Testing the difference between the chauvinism and pride coefficients of Figure 4, by measure and specification.

	Chauvinism – Pride			
	Mean Score		Latent Factor	
	Holds constant the other nationalism dimensions?			
	No	Yes	No	Yes
Log Household Income	−0.028*** (0.005)	−0.048*** (0.010)	−0.026*** (0.008)	−0.064*** (0.016)
Education Years	−0.019*** (0.002)	−0.023*** (0.003)	−0.015*** (0.002)	−0.026*** (0.005)
College Degree	−0.066*** (0.010)	−0.094*** (0.018)	−0.064*** (0.013)	−0.109*** (0.028)
Unemployed	−0.010 (0.010)	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.011)	0.029 (0.024)
Left-Leaning Ideology	−0.031*** (0.005)	−0.024*** (0.006)	−0.036*** (0.008)	−0.030** (0.012)
Female	−0.065*** (0.010)	−0.067*** (0.013)	−0.050*** (0.012)	−0.054*** (0.019)
Age	0.003*** (0.0003)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.005*** (0.001)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondents	78,551	55,460	49,425	31,842

Notes: OLS models. Standard errors from covariance matrices. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Some specifications yield a significant coefficient for one predisposition with a null coefficient for the other, so it is useful to consider the contrast tests in Table 4. As Section 4 noted,

a contrast has a larger standard error than either coefficient because it incorporates their correlation, making this a demanding test. Yet six of the seven gaps have the same sign in all four columns and are statistically significant throughout: higher income, more years of education, a college degree, left-leaning ideology, and being female are each associated with lower chauvinism relative to pride, while older respondents are relatively more chauvinist than proud. Unemployment is the only exception, with neither a consistent sign nor statistical significance.

Taken together, these findings suggest that national pride and national chauvinism are associated with common sociodemographic characteristics in distinct ways, reinforcing the argument that they are distinct theoretical concepts and dimensions of nationalism. Additionally, these findings challenge the conventional wisdom in Comparative Politics that nationalism is primarily driven by lower-income individuals (Shayo, 2009), and suggest that economic security fosters a more inclusive sense of national identity.

5 How Nationalism Predicts Globalization Preferences

This section tests **H2** through **H4**, examining how the three dimensions of nationalism predict globalization preferences. Since the distinction between pride and chauvinism becomes less sharp when the indices are constructed as latent factors, the latent-factor indices should provide harder tests of **H2–H4**. For the following analyses, I therefore present results using the latent-factor indices. Results based on the mean-score indices are reported in Appendix D.

5.1 Baseline Analysis

I estimate the following OLS model to test **H2** through **H4**:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \theta_1 \text{Identification}_{ict} + \theta_2 \text{Pride}_{ict} + \theta_3 \text{Chauvinism}_{ict} + \theta_4 \text{Pride}_{ict} \times \text{Chauvinism}_{ict} + \mathbf{X}'_{ict} \boldsymbol{\beta} + \lambda_{ct} + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ict} represents one of the four primary measures of globalization preferences, $\mathbf{X}_{ict}$ denotes a vector of individual-level control variables with coefficient vector $\boldsymbol{\beta}$, ε_{ict} is the error term, and i , c , and t respectively stand for the respondent, country, and year. λ_{ct} refers to the country-by-year fixed effects (FE) — rather than the more conventional country and year two-way FE — which allows me to compare among individuals within the same country-year sample. The control variables include respondent characteristics (age, gender, household in-

come, college degree, education years, and employment status). Country-level control variables are not necessary given the country-by-year FE. I use robust standard errors clustered at the country-by-year level. One inferential point from Section 4 carries over. Given how strongly the two predispositions are correlated, wherever one of them is statistically significant and the other is not, that pattern by itself does not establish that the two differ; in those cases I report a test of the contrast between the two coefficients.

I begin the analysis as follows. As Round IV does not include a measure for national identification, I first focus on Rounds I–III. I start with latent support for economic globalization as the dependent variable, including the three nationalism variables one at a time before adding them together or interacting them. This allows me to assess how the results vary by nationalism measure, which has implications for both existing and future studies. Results are reported in Table 5, after which I assess whether similar patterns hold for Round IV and the remaining dependent variables.

Columns (1)–(3) of Table 5 show that each nationalism measure has a negative and statistically significant estimate when included individually. When all three are included in column (4), national identification has a null estimate, national pride a positive and statistically significant estimate, and national chauvinism a negative and statistically significant estimate. Column (5) shows a negative and statistically significant interaction between national pride and national chauvinism. These estimates are substantively meaningful: both the dependent variable and the national pride and chauvinism indices are standardized latent factors, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the standard-deviation change in the dependent variable associated with a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable.

Table 6 extends the analysis to Round IV (2022–25). As this round does not include survey items on national identification, I focus on national chauvinism and national pride. The estimates for both dimensions are highly consistent with those from the earlier rounds.

These results support **H2** through **H4** regarding support for trade and FDI and indicate that the relationship between nationalism and attitudes toward trade and FDI depends on whether all three dimensions of nationalism are included in the model. Since these dimensions are likely correlated, national identification and national pride may partly capture the negative effects

Table 5: How the dimensions of nationalism predict support for economic globalization: ISSP National Identity Module Rounds I–III.

Support for: Survey Rounds:	Economic Globalization I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Identification	-0.09*** (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Pride		-0.09*** (0.01)		0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
Chauvinism			-0.24*** (0.010)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.35*** (0.01)
Pride × Chauvinism					-0.03*** (0.008)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	71,211	42,306	42,306	42,306	42,306
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.20	0.24	0.25	0.25

Notes: OLS models. National pride, national chauvinism, and support for economic globalization are standardized latent factor indices constructed from the first principal components of related survey items. Respondent controls include age, gender, household income, education, unemployment, and ideology. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × year level. Full results are reported in Table D1. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: How the dimensions of nationalism predict support for economic globalization: ISSP National Identity Module Round IV.


Support for: Survey Round:	Economic Globalization IV (2022-25)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pride	-0.06** (0.02)		0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Chauvinism		-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.32*** (0.03)	-0.33*** (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism				-0.05*** (0.01)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	24,521	24,521	24,521	24,521
Adjusted R ²	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21

Notes: The same model specifications are used as in Table 5. As Round IV does not include a measure of national identification, columns corresponding to national identification are omitted.

of national chauvinism when included separately in columns (1) and (2). From column (4) onward, national identification has a null estimate, likely because its effects are absorbed by national pride and national chauvinism.

Figure 5 summarizes the results of estimating model (1) for all four primary dependent variables across each survey round. Consider first the results for economic globalization in the top row. As shown in Tables 5 and 6, all three nationalism dimensions predict less support when entered individually (columns (1)–(3)); yet national pride yields significantly positive estimates in both the additive model (column 4) and the model with the pride-chauvinism interaction (column 5). These patterns hold across all four survey rounds.

Figure 5: **Baseline results for all four primary dependent variables and survey rounds.**




Notes: The same model specifications as in Tables 5 and 6 are applied to all four dependent variables across all survey rounds. Full regression results are reported in Table D2.

The findings are largely consistent across the remaining three dependent variables: support for immigration, IO power, and cultural globalization. For cultural globalization, while national pride often yields null estimates in the additive and interactive models, the contrast between the two dimensions remains large and highly significant (-0.381 , $t = -13.0$). Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of national pride across levels of national chauvinism for all four dependent variables. For economic globalization, immigration, and IO power, national pride remains positive and statistically significant even at the highest levels of chauvinism. For cultural globalization, its effect is positive and statistically significant, though small, at low levels

of chauvinism and declines to near zero and insignificance at high levels. These results support **H4**: the effect of national pride is larger when national chauvinism is weaker.

Figure 6: **Marginal effects of national pride on globalization preferences by level of national chauvinism.**




5.2 Issue Heterogeneity

5.2.1 Specific Economic Issues

Figure 7 summarizes the results for individual survey items on economic globalization. The baseline results hold across the three items used to construct the latent factor: concerning support for free imports versus protectionism, foreign multinationals versus local firms, and foreign land ownership. The results differ for the excluded item that does not load onto the same latent factor: *Free trade leads to better products becoming available*. When each nationalism dimension is entered separately, all three predict lower support for this item. However, column (4) shows that in the additive model, greater national pride is associated with substantially lower support, while national chauvinism is not significantly associated with support in either direction.

This heterogeneity suggests that national chauvinism and national pride shape economic policy preferences by motivating individuals to think in terms of intergroup competition and national status. The three items that load onto the same latent factor and yield consistent results are all framed around the harm to domestic products and producers from the influx of foreign goods and capital, whether concerning imports, foreign firms, or foreign land ownership. That these are distinct economic issues yet yield consistent results suggests that the explanatory role of nationalist predispositions is not constrained by narrowly defined economic self-interest.

Figure 7: Results for individual survey items on economic globalization.




Notes: The same model specifications as in Tables 5 and 6 are applied to four individual survey items across all survey rounds: *Our country should limit imports to protect national industry*; *Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land*; *Large international companies damage local business*; *Free trade leads to better products becoming available*.

5.2.2 Different Issues About IOs

Figure 8 summarizes the results for the three individual IO survey items. While IO POWER is used in the baseline analysis, IO DECISIONS and IO ENFORCEMENT do not load onto the same first principal component and are therefore excluded. The baseline results do not hold for these latter two items. As discussed above, I conjecture that this is because IO DECISIONS and IO ENFORCEMENT lack explicit information about national loss, whereas IO POWER directly emphasizes the power balance between IOs and national governments. If so, this divergence would be consistent with the informational mechanism in my theory. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity observed here warrants more rigorous analysis in future research.

5.3 Country Heterogeneity

Figure 8: Results for individual survey items on international organizations.



Notes: The same model specifications as in Tables 5 and 6 are applied to three IO-related survey items across all survey rounds: IO POWER: *IOs are taking too much power from our government*; IO ENFORCEMENT: *International bodies should enforce solutions to issues like pollution*; IO DECISIONS: *Our country should follow IOs' decisions despite disagreement*. In Round IV, IO POWER and IO DECISIONS referred to specific IOs such as the EU.

5.3.1 Subsample Estimation by Country and Year

To reveal result heterogeneity across both countries and years, I estimate model (1) separately for each country-year subsample and for each of the four primary dependent variables. Figures D1 to D4 present subsample-specific results. When the dependent variable is latent support for economic globalization, the pooled baseline result holds for most subsamples. When the dependent variable is latent support for immigration or the power of IOs, fewer subsamples reach statistical significance, but most estimates retain the expected signs. A few outliers emerge: notably, Austria, Estonia, India, and New Zealand yield highly imprecise estimates.

5.3.2 Meta-Analysis

I further conduct a meta-analysis of coefficients estimated for each country-year subsample. Specifically, I regress the country-year-specific estimates of the effects of national pride and chauvinism on support for economic globalization on country-year-level economic and political characteristics, included simultaneously in a multivariate specification with year fixed effects. Figure D5 in the Appendix summarizes the results. Notably, the negative estimates for

national chauvinism are larger in magnitude in countries with lower GDP per capita but higher growth rates (i.e., emerging economies) and similarly larger in democracies. Interestingly, trade openness, measured as either the ratio of imports or exports to GDP, does not moderate the point estimates.

5.3.3 Additional Data: British Election Study (BES) Internet Panels

I replicate the baseline analysis with the BES Internet Panels. The ISSP and BES are, to the best of my knowledge, the only two preexisting public opinion survey programs that have employed survey items that can be used to measure all three dimensions of nationalism. The first wave of the BES Internet Panels was conducted in 2014, and as of this writing, the latest wave (Wave 29) took place in July 2024 (see Table B3 for the full list of samples, enumeration periods, sample sizes, and retention rates). The BES covers England, Scotland, and Wales, but excludes Northern Ireland for political reasons. All waves of the BES Internet Panels have been conducted via YouGov. In Appendix E.1, I apply my measurement strategies for nationalism and globalization preferences to the BES data. In Appendix E.2, I replicate my test of **H1** with the BES data and obtain similar results. Next, I replicate the baseline analysis using the BES data in Appendix E.3. National pride, national chauvinism, and their interaction term all have statistically significant estimates, with signs consistent with the ISSP results above.

5.4 Robustness

5.4.1 Addressing Confounding by Economic Self-Interest Using Balancing Weights

I have shown that national pride and national chauvinism are associated with common demographic variables in distinct ways. Consequently, individuals with strong national pride but not strong national chauvinism may systematically differ from those with strong national chauvinism, meaning that fundamental personal characteristics could confound the effects of nationalism. I have already controlled for several measures of economic self-interest, including education years, college degrees, income, occupational task routineness, and job offshorability.

Further addressing potential confounding by observable economic characteristics requires making respondents with different levels of national pride or chauvinism more comparable on those characteristics. Because pride and chauvinism are continuous treatments, I estimate

balancing weights separately for each predisposition using covariate balancing weighting methods. Intuitively, the weights rebalance the sample so that each predisposition becomes approximately uncorrelated with the measured economic characteristics: after weighting, respondents at different levels of pride (or chauvinism) resemble one another in income, education, and labor-market position, mimicking a design in which the predisposition varies independently of economic self-interest. Any remaining association between the predisposition and globalization preferences therefore cannot be attributed to those observed characteristics. The weighting covariates are household income, age, gender, years of education, college attainment, and unemployment. Appendix D.1 details the candidate estimators, the selection procedure, and the balance diagnostics, which are favorable.

I then re-estimate the baseline fixed-effects model once with weights designed for pride and once with weights designed for chauvinism. Appendix Tables D5 and D6 report the within-country–year and global specifications. Across economic globalization, immigration, IO power, and cultural globalization, pride retains a positive coefficient, chauvinism a negative coefficient, and their interaction a negative coefficient. Balancing on observed covariates cannot eliminate unobserved confounding, but the stability of the results makes it unlikely that the baseline patterns are driven entirely by the measured dimensions of economic self-interest.

5.4.2 Additional Robustness Checks

Measurement of Nationalism The results are also robust to the alternative measures of nationalism and globalization preferences. In Appendix Tables D7 and D8, I show that the results hold when using mean-based indices for the nationalism dimensions. The results are further robust to alternative constructions of the national pride index. In Table D9, I show that the results hold when national pride is measured using only domain-specific items — that is, items asking how proud respondents are of specific aspects of their country such as its democracy, economic achievements, and history — rather than generic items such as *How proud are you of your country*. In Tables D10 and D11, the results remain similar when the pride index excludes the item about pride in democracy and the item about pride in economic achievements, respectively, addressing concerns that these items may overlap conceptually with the dependent variables.

In Table D12, I further control for additional measures of unity-based versus equity-based nationalism, specifically the “membership criteria” questions commonly used to distinguish ethnic from civic nationalism (Powers, 2022). In the baseline analysis, I assume that unity-based content is the antithesis of equity-based content, allowing both to be captured within a single continuous measure of value orientations. The results in Table D12 remain similar, which strengthens confidence that national pride warrants separate treatment.

Additional Covariates The results are robust to additional covariates that are not used in the baseline analysis due to greater missingness. As shown in Table D13, the results are robust to controlling for personal income (instead of household income), household size, and self-placement on a liberal-conservative scale. In Table D14, I show that the results are also robust to including two measures of occupational characteristics from Owen and Johnston (2017): occupational task routineness and job offshorability.

I also utilize additional data on populism and other political and social preferences from the ISSP Citizenship Module conducted in the same years. The 2022–25 and 2002–05 rounds of the Citizenship and National Identity modules were fielded to the same respondents and are therefore officially linked. For the 2012–15 round, which was fielded to the same respondents only in some countries and was not officially linked, I construct original linkages between the two modules.¹⁸ The additional covariates include political interest, general trust, and populism, the last of which is captured by a battery of five survey items newly added to the 2022–25 Citizenship module. Table D15 shows that the baseline results remain robust.

Survey Weights All baseline models are estimated without survey weights. Since my models include country-by-year fixed effects alongside individual-level demographic controls for age, gender, education, and income — the primary dimensions along which ISSP sampling weights adjust — the within-country-year variation identified by my estimator is unlikely to be sensitive to sample composition. Table D16 replicates the main baseline results using population weights provided by the ISSP survey program and confirms that the estimates are substantively unchanged.

¹⁸A shared official identifier does not exist across these surveys, but demographic variables and interview dates are shared. I therefore identify the same respondents by matching on all available demographic variables and interview dates. Five countries are included in these linkages for the 2012–15 round: Georgia, Israel, the Philippines, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The Citizenship Module was not implemented before 2002.

Nonlinear Interaction Finally, I address the assumed functional form for the interaction term between national chauvinism and national pride. The baseline analysis assumes that the interaction term follows a linear, multiplicative functional form. I relax this assumption and allow it to be nonlinear using the `interflex` method developed by [Hainmueller et al. \(2019\)](#). Figures [D7](#) and [D8](#) show that the baseline results remain robust.

5.5 Discussion: Reconciling the Results with Previous Studies

My findings reveal that whether and how nationalism predicts opposition to trade and globalization depends crucially on how nationalism is measured. In particular, whether a measure based on national pride or national identification predicts opposition to globalization depends on whether national chauvinism is controlled for. As the baseline results show, when national identification or national pride is entered alone, it may partly absorb the negative effects of national chauvinism, given that the three dimensions are correlated. Failing to include both national pride and national chauvinism in the same model, therefore, risks obscuring meaningful differences across types of nationalists.

This may explain why, among the previous studies listed in Table [A1](#) that operationalize nationalism as national pride, a few find that national pride predicts trade protectionism. Specifically, [Baker \(2005\)](#), [Kim et al. \(2023\)](#), and [Lobo and Brutger \(2025\)](#) operationalize nationalism using a single survey item about national pride and find that the resulting measure predicts trade protectionism.¹⁹ Unfortunately, I am not able to re-analyze their studies to validate this conjecture, as their surveys did not include measures of national chauvinism.

[Mutz and Kim \(2017\)](#) write: “The fact that nationalistic sentiments are related to trade preferences is also consistent with the general in-group favoritism thesis. Nationalism has been operationalized in many different ways, but when tapped as a belief that American citizens are more deserving than citizens of other countries (as opposed to a sense of patriotism or pride in one’s country or government), it also serves as an indicator of perceived in-group

¹⁹The mixed finding in [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#) regarding national pride is likely due to differences across the separate survey items they use. Their variables `Pride in democracy`, `Pride in political influence`, `Economic pride`, and `Pride in social security system` all capture national pride. `Pride in democracy` predicts support for free trade, `Pride in political influence` predicts protectionism, while the other two have null effects. In contrast, my measure of pride seeks to capture the general tendency underlying all domain-specific pride measures.

superiority. A number of observational studies have found nationalism predictive of anti-trade attitudes” (p. 829). They are right to note that nationalism has often been operationalized either as national chauvinism or as national pride. However, they overlook a key distinction: studies that measure nationalism as pride or patriotism often do not find that it predicts protectionism.

6 How Nationalism Shapes Globalization Preferences

I probe the causal nature of the findings in two steps. First, I examine whether the findings could represent or imply causal effects of changing nationalism in the short term on globalization preferences. To do so, I conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis using a panel subset of the BES data. Second, I test the psychological microfoundations that my proposed informational mechanisms presuppose, namely social dominance orientation and zero-sum thinking.

6.1 Effects of Changing Nationalism in the Short-Term?

As introduced in Section 5.3.3, the BES Internet Panels Waves 7, 9, and 10 allow me to apply my measurement strategy for both nationalist predispositions and globalization preferences. I find similar results from the BES data both for distinguishing national pride from national chauvinism and for the baseline regression analysis. Building on the baseline model specifications, I introduce respondent fixed effects in Table 7. With this specification, the estimates for national pride, national chauvinism, and their interaction term all decrease in magnitude, and most lose statistical significance at the 95% level, except for the two marginal terms in Column (2). When the dependent variable is either support for immigration or support for remaining in the EU, short-term changes in national pride do not correspond to changes in the dependent variable. These results suggest that the correlational findings are more likely to be cross-sectional than to represent the effects of change in nationalism within individuals over time.

In sum, the panel analysis indicates that nationalist predispositions are relatively stable within individuals over time, and that short-term within-person changes in them do not track changes in globalization preferences. The baseline correlational findings are therefore unlikely to represent causal effects of short-term changes in nationalist predispositions on globalization preferences, and are better read as reflecting stable dispositional differences between individuals. This is consistent with previous scholars’ observations that national and social identities

Table 7: **Panel estimation with individual fixed effects: BES Waves 7, 9, 10.**

Support for:	Trade with EU		Immigration		EU Membership	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Identification	0.01*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.06*** (0.007)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Pride	0.05*** (0.004)	0.04*** (0.009)	0.24*** (0.02)	-0.005 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
Chauvinism	-0.11*** (0.004)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-1.1*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.004)	-0.01** (0.005)
Pride $\times$ Chauvinism	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.005)	0.03*** (0.008)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region $\times$ Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent FE		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	39,663	17,858	43,342	20,086	44,528	20,500
Adjusted R ²	0.07	0.39	0.29	0.80	0.21	0.83

Notes: I only include respondents who were interviewed in all three waves 7, 9, and 10. Covariates include the following respondent demographic variables: Personal income, age, gender, education level, ethnicity, left-right ideology, and unemployment. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region $\times$ wave level. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

are generally persistent and difficult to manipulate in survey experiments (Kuo and Margalit, 2012; Mutz and Kim, 2017).

6.2 Psychological Microfoundations

The account in Section 2 rests on a conjecture about microfoundations. I argue that national chauvinism and national pride shape how individuals interpret information about globalization because they reflect different orientations toward intergroup hierarchy and competition: chauvinism relates to social dominance orientation (SDO) and a zero-sum view of intergroup relations, whereas pride reflects satisfaction with the nation as it is and requires neither. The ISSP fields no measure of either orientation, so this conjecture cannot be assessed with the paper’s primary data.

I therefore fielded two original surveys of Americans, the first in March 2024 ($n = 789$) through the Harvard Digital Lab for the Social Sciences,²⁰ and the second in May 2026 ($n = 350$) through Prolific. Both measure national pride and national chauvinism using scales adapted from the ISSP National Identity module, together with SDO using the standard short

²⁰<https://dlabss.harvard.edu>.

battery; the second additionally measures zero-sum thinking, both as a general belief about social and economic life and as a trade-specific belief. I also use the BES Internet Panels, which fielded an eight-item SDO battery in its fifteenth wave. Because that wave was fielded in 2019 while the nationalism measures are available only for 2016, I link the two by panel identifier. This reduces the sample size but measures the predispositions roughly three years *before* the outcome. Question wording is reported in Appendix F.

Table 8: **Nationalist predispositions, social dominance orientation, and zero-sum thinking.**

	Social Dominance Orientation				Zero-Sum Thinking	
	Original US		BES (UK)		Original US 2026	
	2024 (1)	2026 (2)	Wave 7 (3)	Wave 10 (4)	General (5)	Trade (6)
Pride	−0.12*** (0.04)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.09 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.08)
Chauvinism	0.48*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.07)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	−0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Chauvinism – Pride	0.60*** (0.08)	0.61*** (0.12)	0.14** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.07)	−0.04 (0.15)	0.18 (0.15)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	789	349	1,680	1,816	349	349

Notes: All variables are standardized within sample, so coefficients are in within-sample standard deviations. The row Chauvinism – Pride standard error is computed from the coefficient covariance matrix. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 8 reports the estimates. The evidence on SDO is strong and replicates across all three samples: national chauvinism is substantially and significantly associated with SDO in every sample, national pride is not, and the contrast between them is positive and significant throughout. The contrast is nearly identical across the two American surveys and smaller but correctly signed in the BES panel, as expected when the outcome is measured three years after the predispositions. The British panel also fields a right-wing authoritarianism battery, which separates the two predispositions even more sharply than SDO: once chauvinism is held constant, national pride enters significantly *negatively* rather than merely yielding a null estimate. I report these estimates in Appendix F (Table F3).

The evidence on zero-sum thinking is different and sharpens the implications of the findings. Neither predisposition predicts zero-sum beliefs, whether measured as a general outlook

on social and economic life or as a trade-specific belief, and in neither case is the contrast between them distinguishable from zero. This is not what the existing literature would lead one to expect. [Mutz and Kim \(2017\)](#) show that SDO and zero-sum beliefs both predict sensitivity to relative gains, so the natural expectation is that the two nationalist predispositions would differ on both microfoundations. Instead, the evidence suggests that what separates national pride from national chauvinism is how each orients individuals toward their nation's standing relative to others, not whether they are generally disposed to view social and economic life as win-lose. A general competitive worldview is correlated with nationalism, but it is not where the two predispositions diverge. This narrows the microfoundation on which the informational mechanisms rest.

7 Conclusion

To obtain relatively unbiased estimates of nationalism's effects, future studies must measure both national pride and national chauvinism. Many scholars of globalization have operationalized nationalism using only national chauvinism ([O'Rourke et al., 2001](#); [Rankin, 2001](#); [Mansfield and Mutz, 2009](#); [Mutz and Kim, 2017](#); [Owen and Johnston, 2017](#); [Feng et al., 2021](#); [Brutger and Strezhnev, 2022](#); [Brutger and Pond, 2025](#)), national pride ([Baker, 2005](#); [Pandya, 2010](#); [Kim et al., 2023](#); [Lobo and Brutger, 2025](#)), or national identification ([Dolan and Milner, 2023](#); [Jamal and Milner, 2019](#)). I show that regression estimates of nationalism's impact on globalization preferences can vary significantly depending on whether nationalism is measured using a single dimension or a combination of multiple dimensions. In particular, national pride is likely to predict stronger support for globalization when chauvinism is controlled for, but weaker support — or even opposition — when it is not.

This paper examines how national pride and national chauvinism predict support for a range of globalization issues — from trade to IOs — rather than focusing on a single domain. This broader approach allows me to reveal the systematic implications of distinguishing between national pride and national chauvinism. My findings suggest two directions for future research on the role of nationalism in shaping preferences toward specific policy issues.

First, scholars should further examine the relationship between nationalism and attitudes

toward IOs. Most existing studies focus on the EU (Rohrschneider, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Clark and Rohrschneider, 2019; Madsen et al., 2022), while studies of non-EU institutions typically rely on coarse measures of public confidence or general attitudes (Torgler, 2008; Kaya and Walker, 2014; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015; Bearce and Scott, 2019). I find that the relationship between nationalism dimensions and attitudes toward the power of IOs differs from their relationship with attitudes toward IOs' specific functions, such as decision-making and enforcement. Future studies should clarify why this divergence exists.

Second, future research should revisit attitudes toward inward FDI. My results support Pandya (2010)'s finding that national pride may predict support for inward FDI in Latin America. That pioneering study has inspired a growing literature on individual preferences toward inward FDI across contexts (Kaya and Walker, 2012; Jensen and Lindstädt, 2023; Li and Zeng, 2017; Zeng and Li, 2019; Chilton et al., 2020; Feng et al., 2021; Harish et al., 2023; Jud, 2023; Tanaka et al., 2023; Moehlecke et al., 2024; Chen and Chu, 2025; Kim, 2025; Moehlecke et al., 2025). However, with the exception of Feng et al. (2021), none of these studies measures and examines respondents' nationalism. Part of the reason is that most of this literature focuses on how varying characteristics of FDI projects influence public support by employing conjoint experimental designs (Li and Zeng, 2017; Chilton et al., 2020; Jud, 2023; Tanaka et al., 2023; Moehlecke et al., 2024; Kim, 2025; Chen and Chu, 2025; Moehlecke et al., 2025). It is also not straightforward to examine how conjoint treatments interact with respondent characteristics, as estimating interaction effects in conjoint designs presents methodological challenges (Egami and Imai, 2019). Moreover, as many studies experimentally vary the nationality of the investing firm, they often assume that bias against foreign ownership — especially ownership by firms from specific countries (usually China) — captures the effect of nationalism. As a result, the potentially nuanced roles of nationalism in shaping FDI preferences have remained underexplored despite the growing literature.

References

- Baker, Andy**, “Who wants to globalize? Consumer tastes and labor markets in a theory of trade policy beliefs,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2005, 49 (4), 924–938.
- Bankert, Alexa, Ryan Powers, and Geoffrey Sheagley**, “Trade politics at the checkout lane: ethnocentrism and consumer preferences,” *Political Science Research and Methods*, 2022, pp. 1–8.
- Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter**, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade*, 2nd ed., Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972.
- Bearce, David H and Brandy J Scott**, “Popular non-support for international organizations: How extensive and what does this represent?,” *The Review of International Organizations*, 2019, 14 (2), 187–216.
- Bonikowski, Bart and Paul DiMaggio**, “Varieties of American popular nationalism,” *American Sociological Review*, 2016, 81 (5), 949–980.
- Broz, J Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth**, “Populism in place: the economic geography of the globalization backlash,” *International Organization*, 2021, 75 (2), 464–494.
- Brutger, Ryan and Amy Pond**, “International economic relations and American support for antitrust policy,” *Business and Politics*, 2025, pp. 1–21.
- **and Anton Strezhnev**, “International investment disputes, media coverage, and backlash against international law,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2022, 66 (6), 983–1009.
- Chen, Frederick R. and Jonathan A. Chu**, “Firm Nationality and Local Government Preferences for Foreign Direct Investment,” February 2025. Working paper, Ohio State University.
- Chilton, Adam S, Helen V Milner, and Dustin Tingley**, “Reciprocity and public opposition to foreign direct investment,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 2020, 50 (1), 129–153.
- Chinoy, Sahil, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira, and Stefanie Stantcheva**, “Zero-sum thinking and the roots of US political differences,” *American Economic Review*, 2026, 116 (3), 1052–1096.
- Citrin, Jack, Cara Wong, and Brian Duff**, “The meaning of American national identity,” *Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction*, 2001, 3, 71.
- Clark, Nicholas J and Robert Rohrschneider**, “The relationship between national identity and European Union evaluations, 1993–2017,” *European Union Politics*, 2019, 20 (3), 384–405.
- Dawson, Michael C**, *Behind the mule*, Princeton University Press, 1995.
- de Figueiredo Jr, Rui JP and Zachary Elkins**, “Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2003, 47 (1), 171–188.
- Dellmuth, Lisa Maria and Jonas Tallberg**, “The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation in the United Nations,” *Review of International Studies*, 2015, 41 (3), 451–475.
- Dolan, Lindsay R and Helen V Milner**, “Low-Skilled Liberalizers: Support for Free Trade in Africa,” *International Organization*, 2023, 77 (4), 848–870.
- Egami, Naoki and Kosuke Imai**, “Causal interaction in factorial experiments: Application to conjoint analysis,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 2019.

- Feng, Yilang, Andrew Kerner, and Jane L Sumner**, “Quitting globalization: trade-related job losses, nationalism, and resistance to FDI in the United States,” *Political Science Research and Methods*, 2021, 9 (2), 292–311.
- Fieldhouse, E., J. Green, G. Evans, J. Mellon, C. Prosser, J. Bailey, R. de Geus, H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk, J. Griffiths, and S. Perrett**, *British Election Study 2014–2024: Combined Waves 1–29 Internet Panel Codebook* 2024.
- Fiske, Alan Page**, *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations: Communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, market pricing.*, Free Press, 1991.
- Fong, C., C. Hazlett, and K. Imai**, “Covariate balancing propensity score for a continuous treatment,” *The Annals of Applied Statistics*, 2018, 12 (1), 156–177.
- Fordham, Benjamin O and Katja B Kleinberg**, “How can economic interests influence support for free trade?,” *International Organization*, 2012, 66 (2), 311–328.
- Gay, Claudine**, “Putting race in context: Identifying the environmental determinants of Black racial attitudes,” *American Political Science Review*, 2004, 98 (4), 547–562.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J Hopkins**, “Public attitudes toward immigration,” *Annual review of political science*, 2014, 17.
- **and —** , “The hidden American immigration consensus: A conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2015, 59 (3), 529–548.
- **and Michael J Hiscox**, “Learning to love globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade,” *International Organization*, 2006, 60 (2), 469–498.
- **and —** , “Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe,” *International organization*, 2007, 61 (2), 399–442.
- **and —** , “Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment,” *American political science review*, 2010, 104 (1), 61–84.
- **, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu**, “How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice,” *Political Analysis*, 2019, 27 (2), 163–192.
- Harish, S.P., Helen Milner, and Nita Rudra**, “Do Workers in Developing Countries Love Globalization? Analyzing the Informal-Formal Divide,” *Working Paper*, 2023.
- Henry, Kelly Bouas, Holly Arrow, and Barbara Carini**, “A tripartite model of group identification: Theory and measurement,” *Small group research*, 1999, 30 (5), 558–581.
- Herrmann, Richard K**, “How attachments to the nation shape beliefs about the world: A theory of motivated reasoning,” *International organization*, 2017, 71 (S1), S61–S84.
- **, Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti**, “Attachment to the nation and international relations: Dimensions of identity and their relationship to war and peace,” *Political Psychology*, 2009, 30 (5), 721–754.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks**, “Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration?,” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 2004, 37 (3), 415–420.

- **and** — , “Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration,” *European Union Politics*, 2005, 6 (4), 419–443.
- Huddy, Leonie and Nadia Khatib**, “American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2007, 51 (1), 63–77.
- ISSP Research Group**, “International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III — ISSP 2013,” GESIS Data Archive, Cologne 2015. ZA5950 Data file Version 2.0.0.
- Jamal, Amaney and Helen V Milner**, “Economic self-interest, information, and trade policy preferences: Evidence from an experiment in Tunisia,” *Review of International Political Economy*, 2019, 26 (4), 545–572.
- Jensen, Nathan M. and René Lindstädt**, “Globalization with Whom: Context-Dependent Foreign Direct Investment Preferences,” 2023. Working paper, Washington University in St. Louis and University of Essex.
- Jud, Stefano**, “Beyond pandering: Investment project quality, voter support, and the use of investment incentives,” *Business and Politics*, 2023, 25 (4), 429–449.
- Kaya, Ayse and James T Walker**, “The legitimacy of foreign investors: Individual attitudes toward the impact of multinational enterprises,” *Multinational Business Review*, 2012, 20 (3), 266–295.
- **and** — , “How do multilateral institutions influence individual perceptions of international affairs? Evidence from Europe and Asia,” *The European Journal of Development Research*, 2014, 26 (5), 832–852.
- Kertzer, Joshua D and Ryan Brutger**, “Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into audience cost theory,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2016, 60 (1), 234–249.
- Kim, Doeun**, “What Money Can’t (or Can) Buy: Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Backlash against Globalization in the United States,” 2025. Working paper, Princeton University.
- Kim, Sung Eun, Jong Hee Park, Inbok Rhee, and Joonseok Yang**, “Target, Information, and Trade Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in East Asia,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2023, 67 (4), 898–914.
- Kuo, Alexander and Yotam Margalit**, “Measuring individual identity: Experimental evidence,” *Comparative Politics*, 2012, 44 (4), 459–479.
- Kustov, Alexander**, “Borders of compassion: Immigration preferences and parochial altruism,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 2021, 54 (3-4), 445–481.
- Li, Xiaojun and Ka Zeng**, “Individual preferences for FDI in developing countries: experimental evidence from China,” *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 2017, 4 (3), 195–205.
- Lobo, Daniel and Ryan Brutger**, “Fairness According to Whom? Divergent Perceptions of Fairness among White and Black Americans and Its Effect on Trade Attitudes,” *American Political Science Review*, 2025, pp. 1–14.
- Madsen, Mikael Rask, Juan A Mayoral, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten**, “Sovereignty, Substance, and Public Support for European Courts’ Human Rights Rulings,” *American Political Science Review*, 2022, 116 (2), 419–438.
- Mansfield, Edward D and Diana C Mutz**, “Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety,” *International Organization*, 2009, 63 (3), 425–457.

- Margalit, Yotam**, “Lost in globalization: International economic integration and the sources of popular discontent,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 2012, 56 (3), 484–500.
- Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik**, “Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?,” *European Economic Review*, 2005, 49 (6), 1393–1430.
- Miller, David and Sundas Ali**, “Testing the national identity argument,” *European Political Science Review*, 2014, 6 (2), 237–259.
- Moehlecke, Carolina, Guilherme N Fasolin, and Matias Spektor**, “Beyond Jobs: When Citizens Reject Socially Irresponsible Foreign Direct Investment,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 2025, 69 (3), sqaf046.
- , **Matias Spektor, and Guilherme Fasolin**, “Drivers of Negative Perceptions of Chinese FDI: Experimental Evidence from Brazil,” *Working Paper, Fundacao Getulio Vargas*, 2024.
- Mutz, Diana C**, *Winners and losers: The psychology of foreign trade*, Vol. 27, Princeton University Press, 2021.
- **and Eunji Kim**, “The impact of in-group favoritism on trade preferences,” *International Organization*, 2017, 71 (4), 827–850.
- Naoi, Megumi**, “Survey experiments in international political economy: what we (don’t) know about the backlash against globalization,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2020, 23, 333–356.
- Nincic, Miroslav and Jennifer M Ramos**, “The sources of patriotism: Survey and experimental evidence,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2012, 8 (4), 373–388.
- O’Rourke, Kevin H, Richard Sinnott, J David Richardson, and Dani Rodrik**, “The determinants of individual trade policy preferences: International survey evidence [with comments and discussion],” in “Brookings trade forum” JSTOR 2001, pp. 157–206.
- Owen, Erica and Noel P Johnston**, “Occupation and the political economy of trade: Job routineness, offshorability, and protectionist sentiment,” *International Organization*, 2017, 71 (4), 665–699.
- Pandya, Sonal S**, “Labor markets and the demand for foreign direct investment,” *International Organization*, 2010, 64 (3), 389–409.
- Parker, Christopher S**, “Symbolic versus blind patriotism: Distinction without difference?,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 2010, 63 (1), 97–114.
- Powers, Kathleen E**, *Nationalisms in International Politics*, Vol. 32, Princeton University Press, 2022.
- , **Jason Reifler, and Thomas J Scotto**, “Going nativist: how nativism and economic ideology interact to shape beliefs about global trade,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2021, 17 (3), orab015.
- Pratto, Felicia, Atilla Çıdam, Andrew L Stewart, Fouad Bou Zeineddine, María Aranda, Antonio Aiello, Xenia Chryssochoou, Aleksandra Cichocka, J Christopher Cohrs, Kevin Durrheim et al.**, “Social dominance in context and in individuals: Contextual moderation of robust effects of social dominance orientation in 15 languages and 20 countries,” *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 2013, 4 (5), 587–599.
- Rankin, David M**, “Identities, interests, and imports,” *Political Behavior*, 2001, 23 (4), 351–376.
- Robinson, Amanda Lea**, “Nationalism and ethnic-based trust: Evidence from an African border region,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 2016, 49 (14), 1819–1854.

- Rohrschneider, Robert**, “The democracy deficit and mass support for an EU-wide government,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2002, pp. 463–475.
- Schatz, Robert T, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine**, “On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism,” *Political psychology*, 1999, 20 (1), 151–174.
- Scheve, Kenneth F and Matthew J Slaughter**, “Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2001, 83 (1), 133–145.
- **and —**, “What determines individual trade-policy preferences?,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2001, 54 (2), 267–292.
- Shayo, Moses**, “A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution,” *American Political science review*, 2009, 103 (2), 147–174.
- Sides, John and Jack Citrin**, “European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests and information,” *British journal of political science*, 2007, 37 (3), 477–504.
- Sniderman, Paul M, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior**, “Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities,” *American political science review*, 2004, 98 (1), 35–49.
- Stantcheva, Stefanie**, “Perceptions, Mindsets and Beliefs Shaping Policy Views (2024 Economica–Coase Lecture),” Lecture delivered at the Economica–Coase Lecture, London School of Economics May 2024. *Economica* (forthcoming); recording of the Coase Lecture available online.
- Staub, Ervin**, “Blind versus Constructive Patriotism: Moving from Embeddedness in the Group to Critical Loyalty and Action,” *Political Psychology*, 1997, 18 (1), 1–24.
- Tajfel, Henri, John C Turner, William G Austin, and Stephen Worchel**, “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict,” *Organizational identity: A reader*, 1979, 56 (65), 9780203505984–16.
- Tanaka, Ayumu, Banri Ito, and Naoto Jinji**, “Individual preferences toward inward foreign direct investment: A survey experiment,” *Journal of Asian Economics*, 2023, 88, 101644.
- Torgler, Benno**, “Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations,” *The Review of International Organizations*, 2008, 3 (1), 65–93.
- Zeng, Ka and Xiaojun Li**, “Geopolitics, nationalism, and foreign direct investment: Perceptions of the China threat and American public attitudes toward Chinese FDI,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2019, 12 (4), 495–518.

Appendix for “Is Nationalism Driving the Backlash Against Globalization?”

Jerry J. Min (jiemin@fas.harvard.edu)

August 13, 2026

A	Measurements of Nationalism in Existing Studies	1
B	Samples and Summary Statistics	5
C	Distributions of National Pride and Chauvinism	7
D	Regression Results	12
E	BES Data and Results	28
F	Evidence from Two Original Surveys	31

A Measurements of Nationalism in Existing Studies

A.1 Studies on Preferences for Trade/FDI

O’Rourke et al. (2001)

O’Rourke et al. (2001) distinguish between two types of nationalist sentiment: patriotism and chauvinism. They describe patriotism as a sense of preference for and perceived superiority of one’s own country, while chauvinism reflects a more rigid, unquestioning loyalty — the “my country, right or wrong” mindset. Both forms of nationalism are shown to be strongly associated with support for trade protectionism.

Rankin (2001)

Rankin (2001) operationalize American nationalism as three separate dimensions: `patriotic`, `sovereign`, and `cultural` nationalism. Note that, different from usual operationalizations where patriotism and pride are treated similarly, here `patriotic` is measured as expressed feelings of national superiority relative to other countries. Specifically, it is based on survey responses to the following three statements: “America a better country than others”; “Rather be citizen of America than any country”; “World better place if other countries like US.” Similarly, `sovereign` also captures chauvinism namely subjective superiority over other nations, as it is based on the following three statements: “Foreigners not be allowed to buy US land”; “TV prefer US films/programs over others”; “America follow interests even if causes conflict.” Lastly, `cultural` is similar to ethnocentrism as it is based on statements about immigrants and outgroups (“Help ethnic minorities preserve traditions”; “Increase number of immigrants to America”; “Schools teach more foreign languages.”) See page 361 for the variable definitions.

Mayda and Rodrik (2005)

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) operationalize nationalism using both national pride and national chauvinism (perceived superiority).

- Their variable `National pride (1)` corresponds to national identification.
- Their variables `National pride (2)` all correspond to national chauvinism.
- Their variables `Pride in democracy`, `Pride in political influence`, `Economic pride`, `Pride in social security system` capture national pride. `Pride in democracy` predicts support for free trade, `Pride in political influence` predicts protectionism, while the other two variables have null effects.

Mansfield and Mutz (2009)

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) also use these questions to operationalize “nationalism.” They find that nationalism is negatively correlated with support for trade, but the effect is not significant and dominated by those of ethnocentrism and isolationism.

Table A1: Published studies on trade and FDI attitudes that address “Nationalism” as an explanatory variable.

Study	Issue	Operationalization of “nationalism” and basic finding			Sample	Research Design
		National Chauvinism Superiority & priority of my nation over other nations e.g.: “America First”	National Pride How proud am I of my country? e.g.: “Proudly American”	National Identification Importance of my national identity relative to my other identities, e.g.: “more American than Californian”		
O’Rourke et al. (2001)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	Global	Observational Survey
Rankin (2001)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	US	Observational Survey
Baker (2005)	Free Trade	Not Used	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Global	Observational Survey
Mayda and Rodrik (2005)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Yes; mixed results	Yes; mixed results	Global	Observational Survey
Mansfield and Mutz (2009)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	US	Observational Survey
Mutz and Kim (2017)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	US	Survey Experiment
Owen and Johnston (2017)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	Global	Observational Survey
Jamal and Milner (2019)	Free Trade	Not Used	Not Used	Yes; null result	Tunisia	Survey Experiment
Brutger and Strezhev (2022)	Free Trade	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	US	Survey Experiment
Dolan and Milner (2023)	Free Trade	Not Used	Yes; predicts support	Yes; mixed results	Africa	Observational Survey
Kim et al. (2023)	Free Trade	Not Used	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	East Asia	Survey Experiment
Lobo and Brutger (2025)	Free Trade	Not Used	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	US	Survey Experiment
Pandya (2010)	Inward FDI	Not Used	Yes; predicts support	Not Used	Latin America	Observational Survey
Feng et al. (2021)	Inward FDI	Yes; predicts opposition	Not Used	Not Used	US	Survey Experiment

Notes: 1) **Classification criteria and original measures:** This table summarizes the diverse ways in which nationalism has been measured in published studies of individual preferences over free trade and inward FDI. I categorize these measurements by closely examining the wording of the survey items from which they are constructed, focusing on their actual meanings and implications rather than the *de jure* labels or terminologies employed by the authors. Please see Appendix A for the detailed nationalism measurements used in these papers, as well as notes on the “mixed” results. 2) **Additional unpublished study:** In an unpublished working paper, Harish et al. (2023) examine whether nationalism can explain Indian workers’ attitudes towards FDI from the US, namely American multinational companies. They find that nationalism partially drives aversion to US FDI in one of their two survey sites, but find a null relationship in the other site. 3) **Related concepts:** A number of studies also examine how the closely related concepts of *ethnocentrism* and *nativism* predict trade attitudes. These two concepts are measured using survey questions that emphasize attitudes toward different racial and ethnic groups — including immigrants and domestic outgroups — rather than different nations and countries. These include: Mansfield and Mutz (2009), Powers et al. (2021), Bankert et al. (2022), and Dolan and Milner (2023). Please also see Appendix A for the measurements of *ethnocentrism* and *nativism* in these papers.

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) include two related variables Isolationism and Ethnocentrism together with Nationalism in the same regression model, finding that Isolationism and Ethnocentrism predict protectionism while Nationalism does not. The null effect of Nationalism could be a result of collinearity with the other two variables.

Mutz and Kim (2017)

Mutz and Kim (2017) use three statements to measure respondents' belief that the US is superior to other countries: "In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others"; (2) "I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world"; and (3) "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans."

Owen and Johnston (2017)

Owen and Johnston (2017) use responses to the following statements: "I would rather be a citizen of [Country] than any other country in the world" and "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like people from [Country]."

Jamal and Milner (2019)

Jamal and Milner (2019) use the following statement: "My Tunisian identity is more important than any other identity."

Brutger and Strezhnev (2022)

Brutger and Strezhnev (2022) use the following questions: "How superior is the [United States/Canada] compared to other nations?" and "How many things about [America/Canada] make you ashamed?" Their dependent variables include support for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

Lobo and Brutger (2025)

Lobo and Brutger (2025) use the following two questions "When someone says something bad about American people, how strongly do you feel it is as if they said something bad about you?" and "How much do you feel that what happens to America in general will be your fate?"

Dolan and Milner (2023)

Dolan and Milner (2023)'s original surveys use the same question as in Afrobarometer to measure National Identity. National pride is measured by "How proud are you to be Ghanaian?" Dolan and Milner (2023) also examines Ethnocentrism and Xenophobia in Round 6 and Round 8 of Afrobarometer. Ethnocentrism predicts trade protectionism in Round 6 of Afrobarometer but has null effects in Round 8. Xenophobia predicts trade protectionism in both Round 6 and Round 8 of Afrobarometer.

Dolan and Milner (2023)'s findings for the National Identity variable is that it predicts support for free trade in Round 6 of Afrobarometer but has null effects in Round 8; in their original survey in Ghana 2016, National identity predicts support for free trade when education is not controlled for, but has null effects when education is controlled for; In their Uganda 2017 survey, National Identity does not predict either support for free trade or protectionism. National pride, measured in their Ghana 2016 survey, strongly predicts support for free trade regardless of whether education is controlled for.

Kim et al. (2023)

Kim et al. (2023) measure nationalism using a single question that asks respondents to what extent they are proud to be Chinese/Japanese/South Korean.

Pandya (2010)

Pandya (2010) operationalizes nationalism using a survey question directly addressing national pride: "How proud are you to be [nationality]?" While she initially expects nationalism to predict opposition to FDI, she surprisingly finds that national pride has either a positive or null relationship with support for inward FDI, depending on the survey year. She notes, "[f]or all of the reasons that trade might be an affront to nationalist sentiment, FDI should evoke even stronger opposition. The absence of a large, robust effect of nationalism on FDI preferences is notable because it disproves the common assertion that nationalism motivates opposition to FDI" (p. 404).

Feng et al. (2021)

"We want to isolate a less plausibly endogenous form of cultural nationalism rather than economic nationalism and want further to avoid indicators of nationalism that might tap into attitudes toward China specifically. To do so, we asked respondents whether students should be required by law to stand and say the Pledge of Allegiance

and whether they agree that American culture is superior to other cultures. We code as ‘nationalist’ anyone who answered both questions affirmatively. Everyone else is coded as non-nationalist” (p. 299).

A.2 Studies that examine *ethnocentrism* and *nativism* in trade attitudes

Mansfield and Mutz (2009)

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) include two related variables Isolationism and Ethnocentrism together with Nationalism in the same regression model.

Powers et al. (2021)

Powers et al. (2021) examines how *nativism* interacts with economic ideology in predicting trade attitudes. They describe their measurement of *nativism* as follows: “Additive scales for nativism based on eight (United States, 0.85) or nine items (United Kingdom, 0.90) tap participants’ antipathy to immigrants and preference for a homogeneous homeland (Iakhnis et al. 2018)” (page 9) The nativism items comprise a single latent factor and tap the cultural fears and group-based distinctions at the heart of the construct.

B Samples and Summary Statistics

Table B1: Sample sizes by country and survey round: ISSP National Identity Module

Country	Sample Size				Country	Sample Size			
	Round I 1994–96	Round II 2002–05	Round III 2012–15	Round IV 2022–25		Round I 1994–96	Round II 2002–05	Round III 2012–15	Round IV 2022–25
Australia	2438	2183	0	993	Austria	1007	1006	0	1146
Belgium	0	0	2202	0	Bulgaria	1105	1069	0	0
Canada	1543	1211	0	2127	Chile	0	1505	0	0
Croatia	0	0	1000	1400	Czechia	1111	1276	1909	0
Denmark	0	1322	1325	1254	Estonia	0	0	1009	0
Finland	0	1379	1243	1369	France	0	1669	2017	1905
Georgia	0	0	1498	0	Germany	1894	1287	1717	1545
Greece	0	0	0	1463	Hungary	1000	1021	1007	1023
Iceland	0	0	1082	0	India	0	0	1530	1605
Ireland	994	1065	1215	0	Israel	0	1218	1204	1197
Italy	1094	0	0	1135	Japan	1256	1102	1234	0
Latvia	1044	1000	1000	0	Lithuania	0	0	1194	1257
Mexico	0	0	1062	1025	Netherlands	2089	1823	0	1509
New Zealand	1043	1036	0	1191	Norway	1527	1469	1585	1132
Philippines	1200	1200	1200	1800	Poland	1598	1277	0	0
Portugal	0	1602	1001	0	Russia	1585	2383	1516	1574
Slovakia	1388	1152	1156	1025	Slovenia	1036	1093	1010	1039
South Africa	0	2483	2739	3112	South Korea	0	1315	1294	1230
Spain	1221	1212	1225	0	Sweden	1296	1186	1090	1607
Switzerland	0	1037	1237	3202	Taiwan	0	2016	1952	1563
Thailand	0	0	0	1500	Turkey	0	0	1666	0
United Kingdom	1058	873	904	3183	United States	1367	1216	1274	1589
Uruguay	0	1108	0	0	Venezuela	0	1199	0	0
Total Countries						23	34	33	30
Total Respondents						30,894	45,993	45,297	46,700

Table B2: Measuring nationalism dimensions using ISSP data: supplementary national “Membership Criteria” questions.

Survey Item	Survey Round	Latent Factor
<i>For being truly [Nationality], how important is it to</i>		
<i>(for unity-based content)</i>		
...be born in the country?	1 – 4	✓
...have the national ancestry?	1 – 4	✓
...be a [Religion]?	1 – 4	✓
<i>(for equity-based content)</i>		
...respect our political institutions and laws	1 – 4	✓
...have citizenship?	1 – 4	✓
...feel [Nationality]	1 – 4	✓
...living most of your life here?	1 – 3	✓
...be able to speak the national language?	1 – 3	✓

Table B3: Summary of British Election Study Internet Panels Waves 1-29.

Wave	Year	Start	End	Sample	% Took last wave	% Took Wave 1
1	2014	20 Feb	9 Mar	30,590	-	-
2	2014	22 May	25 Jun	30,219	88.9%	88.9%
3	2014	19 Sep	17 Oct	27,839	79.4%	71.0%
4	2015	4 Mar	30 Mar	31,328	84.6%	62.7%
5	2015	31 Mar	6 May	30,725	89.6%	58.5%
6	2015	8 May	26 May	30,027	90.9%	55.6%
7	2016	14 Apr	4 May	30,895	70.0%	44.0%
8	2016	6 May	22 Jun	33,502	79.1%	37.7%
9	2016	24 Jun	4 Jul	30,036	82.2%	33.6%
10	2016	24 Nov	12 Dec	30,319	64.5%	24.3%
11	2017	24 Apr	3 May	31,014	70.9%	21.2%
12	2017	5 May	7 Jun	34,464	81.9%	19.3%
13	2017	9 Jun	23 Jun	31,196	77.4%	17.5%
14	2018	4 May	21 May	31,063	65.5%	13.9%
15	2019	11 Mar	29 Mar	30,842	64.8%	10.6%
16	2019	24 May	18 Jun	37,959	65.1%	8.0%
17	2019	1 Nov	12 Nov	34,366	59.0%	6.2%
18	2019	13 Nov	11 Dec	37,825	74.0%	5.2%
19	2019	13 Dec	23 Dec	32,177	69.3%	4.6%
20	2020	3 Jun	21 Jun	31,468	55.3%	2.9%
21	2021	7 May	25 May	30,281	52.5%	2.1%
22	2021	26 Nov	15 Dec	28,113	63.5%	1.7%
23	2022	6 May	26 May	30,949	72.0%	1.5%
24	2022	1 Dec	14 Dec	15,439	41.7%	0.8%
25	2023	5 May	23 May	30,407	63.0%	-
26	2024	3 May	22 May	30,064	65.6%	-
27	2024	24 May	7 Jun	30,445	74.0%	-
28	2024	10 Jun	3 Jul	31,582	76.4%	-
29	2024	5 Jul	19 Jul	31,098	78.5%	-

Notes: Information is compiled from [Fieldhouse et al. \(2024\)](#). Wave 24 has a smaller size, “This was a supplemental wave with a reduced sample size, that mainly includes only core BESIP questions. As such, 15,439 respondents took wave 24 of the British Election Study.” ([Fieldhouse et al., 2024](#), 5)

C Distributions of National Pride and Chauvinism


Table C1: Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism: Round I (1994–96)

Sample	% Both Above Mean	% Both Below Mean	% Above-Mean Pride, Below-Mean Chauvinism	% Below-Mean Pride Above-Mean Chauvinism
Australia	33.9%	31.4%	18.7%	15.9%
Austria	39.8%	28.7%	15.2%	16.3%
Bulgaria	37.5%	23.6%	18.5%	20.3%
Canada	39.2%	26.9%	14.6%	19.3%
Czechia	35.8%	22.4%	17.2%	24.6%
Germany	37.6%	30.1%	18.9%	13.4%
Hungary	34.4%	27.8%	18%	19.8%
Ireland	33.3%	26.7%	18%	22%
Italy	36.4%	25.1%	17.7%	20.9%
Japan	40.8%	26%	12.5%	20.7%
Latvia	35.3%	26.2%	14.3%	24.3%
Netherlands	32.1%	28%	22.1%	17.7%
New Zealand	37.8%	24.2%	19.2%	18.8%
Norway	35.4%	26.6%	22.3%	15.7%
Philippines	35.7%	27.2%	18.3%	18.8%
Poland	35.4%	26.8%	16.3%	21.5%
Russia	33.1%	23.5%	21.7%	21.8%
Slovakia	36.2%	31.7%	14.6%	17.4%
Slovenia	35.9%	27.9%	14.8%	21.3%
Spain	37.9%	26.6%	17.3%	18.2%
Sweden	33.8%	26.6%	22.5%	17.1%
United Kingdom	40.6%	28.1%	12.2%	19.1%
United States	39.2%	27.3%	16.6%	17%

Table C2: Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism: Round II (2002–05)

Sample	% Both Above Mean	% Both Below Mean	% Above-Mean Pride, Below-Mean Chauvinism	% Below-Mean Pride Above-Mean Chauvinism
Australia	41.1%	27.3%	16.1%	15.4%
Austria	42.7%	23.1%	18.4%	15.8%
Bulgaria	41.8%	22.2%	12.9%	23%
Canada	36.3%	26.1%	19.5%	18%
Chile	35.7%	26.1%	17.8%	20.4%
Czechia	35.4%	24.1%	18.1%	22.4%
Denmark	38.6%	25.2%	17.1%	19.1%
Finland	35.5%	26.5%	21%	17%
France	35.5%	24.6%	20.6%	19.3%
Germany	34.5%	26%	21.9%	17.6%
Hungary	39.4%	25.9%	13.5%	21.1%
Ireland	39.5%	26.6%	16%	17.9%
Israel	39.2%	27.1%	14.6%	19%
Japan	39.5%	27.7%	14.5%	18.4%
Latvia	37.9%	27.4%	17%	17.7%
Netherlands	32.6%	27%	22%	18.4%
New Zealand	39.7%	24.6%	16.3%	19.3%
Norway	34.6%	30.2%	18.7%	16.5%
Philippines	35.2%	27.6%	16.6%	20.6%
Poland	37.4%	25.6%	13.2%	23.8%
Portugal	34.9%	27.4%	15.5%	22.2%
Russia	34.8%	25.4%	16.5%	23.3%
Slovakia	36.9%	26.9%	15.7%	20.4%
Slovenia	34.5%	28.1%	16.5%	20.9%
South Africa	35.5%	25.6%	19.7%	19.2%
South Korea	36.8%	32.1%	15.1%	16%
Spain	42.1%	23.8%	16.3%	17.8%
Sweden	36.1%	25.2%	15.9%	22.8%
Switzerland	39.2%	29%	15.5%	16.2%
Taiwan	39.5%	27.1%	13.1%	20.3%
United Kingdom	39.3%	26.7%	17.2%	16.9%
United States	40.3%	26.1%	13.3%	20.3%
Uruguay	33%	30.1%	17%	19.9%
Venezuela	37.8%	21.4%	19.8%	21%

Figure C1: Correlation between national pride and national chauvinism indices.



Notes: Pairwise correlation estimates, histograms, and scatter plots for the mean score index (left) and the latent factor index (right), pooled across all survey rounds.

Table C3: Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism: Round III (2012–15)

Sample	% Both Above Mean	% Both Below Mean	% Above-Mean Pride, Below-Mean Chauvinism	% Below-Mean Pride Above-Mean Chauvinism
Belgium	38.3%	23.2%	18.7%	19.8%
Croatia	37.9%	29.7%	15%	17.3%
Czechia	39%	25.4%	12.1%	23.5%
Denmark	40.8%	25.2%	15.7%	18.3%
Estonia	45%	25.9%	14.3%	14.8%
Finland	41.7%	21.6%	14.6%	22.1%
France	39.7%	21.1%	18.6%	20.6%
Georgia	36.1%	26.6%	16.9%	20.4%
Germany	37.1%	27.8%	21.4%	13.6%
Hungary	37.8%	27.7%	16.6%	18%
Iceland	33.1%	27.4%	21.3%	18.1%
India	36.6%	26%	21.4%	16%
Ireland	41.3%	25.6%	15.1%	18%
Israel	40.4%	24.5%	17.4%	17.7%
Japan	38.8%	28.5%	17.7%	15%
Latvia	37%	33.2%	15.1%	14.7%
Lithuania	34.4%	29.4%	22.8%	13.4%
Mexico	35.8%	28.8%	18.6%	16.8%
Norway	41.2%	22.6%	14.8%	21.4%
Philippines	31.5%	26.9%	21.1%	20.4%
Portugal	37.9%	24.3%	16.4%	21.3%
Russia	36.5%	26.5%	21.1%	15.8%
Slovakia	41.6%	25.2%	12.7%	20.5%
Slovenia	36.3%	27.3%	17.1%	19.3%
South Africa	39.5%	22.6%	16.1%	21.9%
South Korea	38.6%	29%	11.4%	21%
Spain	44.1%	28.2%	11%	16.7%
Sweden	31.9%	26.8%	24.1%	17.2%
Switzerland	40%	25.4%	14.1%	20.6%
Taiwan	38.6%	27.5%	13.5%	20.5%
Turkey	45.9%	23.3%	16%	14.8%
United Kingdom	34.2%	29.3%	22.2%	14.2%
United States	39.6%	25%	14.7%	20.8%

Table C4: Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism: Round IV (2022–25)

Sample	% Both Above Mean	% Both Below Mean	% Above-Mean Pride, Below-Mean Chauvinism	% Below-Mean Pride, Above-Mean Chauvinism
Australia	32.7%	31.8%	14.3%	21.1%
Austria	37.3%	28.7%	17%	17%
Canada	31.4%	36.7%	15.2%	16.6%
Croatia	32.5%	35%	16.6%	15.9%
Denmark	37%	24.6%	23.3%	15.2%
Finland	32.2%	27.8%	23.9%	16.1%
France	37.1%	26.7%	18.6%	17.6%
Germany	32.8%	27%	19.6%	20.6%
Greece	31.6%	32.8%	18.6%	16.9%
Hungary	35.5%	38.6%	9.8%	16.1%
India	37.9%	30.9%	13.6%	17.6%
Israel	38.4%	33.1%	14.2%	14.3%
Italy	32.2%	30.1%	15.6%	22.1%
Lithuania	35.1%	26.4%	17.1%	21.5%
Mexico	37%	27.4%	17.7%	18%
Netherlands	30.1%	32%	15.6%	22.3%
New Zealand	29.6%	30.8%	16%	23.6%
Norway	31.6%	26.8%	18.9%	22.7%
Philippines	30%	28.9%	17.2%	23.9%
Russia	45.5%	22.6%	17.5%	14.4%
Slovakia	35%	28.6%	15%	21.4%
Slovenia	32.4%	28.3%	22.8%	16.5%
South Africa	29.3%	30.7%	18.3%	21.8%
South Korea	31.4%	28.1%	24.3%	16.2%
Sweden	32.7%	24.8%	21.7%	20.8%
Switzerland	35.9%	29.9%	14.6%	19.6%
Taiwan	35.6%	32.4%	15.8%	16.2%
Thailand	34.3%	27.3%	20.5%	17.9%
United States	32.4%	30.6%	20.5%	16.6%

Table C5: The demographic correlates of national pride and national chauvinism: Latent factor.

DV:	Chauvinism	Pride	Chauvinism	Pride (Latent)	Chauvinism	Pride	Chauvinism	Pride
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Household Income	-0.02** (0.007)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.02*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.04*** (0.007)	0.02*** (0.008)	-0.04*** (0.008)	0.02** (0.009)
Unemployed	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
College Degree	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Education Years	-0.03*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.002)
Female	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.010)	0.02** (0.009)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age	0.009*** (0.0006)	0.006*** (0.0007)	0.008*** (0.0006)	0.006*** (0.0007)	0.005*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0005)	-0.0007 (0.0005)
Other Dimensions Constant			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Country $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	69,531	69,531	49,425	49,425	43,977	43,977	31,842	31,842
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS model. The national chauvinism and national pride indices are latent factors. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country $\times$ year level. A robustness check using personal income instead of household income is reported in Appendix Table C8.

Table C6: The demographic correlates of national pride and national chauvinism: Mean score.

DV:	Chauvinism	Pride	Chauvinism	Pride (Mean)	Chauvinism	Pride	Chauvinism	Pride
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Household Income	-0.02*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.04*** (0.005)	0.01*** (0.005)	-0.03*** (0.007)	0.01*** (0.005)
Unemployed	-0.02** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.01** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.007)
College Degree	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.07*** (0.01)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.09*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.009)
Education Years	-0.03*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.03*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.02*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.02*** (0.002)	0.0006 (0.001)
Female	-0.05*** (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.06*** (0.008)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.04*** (0.008)	0.02*** (0.006)	-0.05*** (0.009)	0.02*** (0.006)
Age	0.005*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.005*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.0003)	0.004*** (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	0.004*** (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Other Dimensions Constant			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Country $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	112,866	112,781	78,551	78,556	78,999	78,999	55,460	55,460
Adjusted R ²	0.18	0.43	0.19	0.45	0.33	0.56	0.34	0.57

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS model. The national chauvinism and national pride indices are mean scores. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country $\times$ year level.

Table C7: The demographic correlates of national identification.

DV:	Identification (Mean)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Household Income	0.02*** (0.006)	0.01* (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.03*** (0.007)
Unemployed	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02** (0.009)	0.02** (0.01)
College Degree	0.0002 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.01 (0.009)	0.02** (0.01)
Education Years	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.0009 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female	0.02* (0.008)	0.01 (0.009)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.007)
Age	0.006*** (0.0004)	0.006*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0003)	0.003*** (0.0003)
Other Dimensions Constant			Yes	Yes
Country $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	79,346	55,671	43,977	31,842
Adjusted R ²	0.52	0.52	0.69	0.70

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS model. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country $\times$ year level.

Table C8: Distinct demographic correlates: robustness with personal income measure

	Identification (1)	Pride (2)	Chauvinism (3)	Identification (4)	Pride (5)	Chauvinism (6)
Age	0.006*** (0.0004)	0.006*** (0.0006)	0.009*** (0.0006)	0.003*** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)
Male	-0.02** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.009)	0.04*** (0.01)
Personal Income	0.01** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.02** (0.008)	0.03*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.02*** (0.006)
College Degree	0.003 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.008 (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Education Years	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.003)
Unemployed	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Identification					0.20*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.01)
Chauvinism				0.13*** (0.009)	0.66*** (0.01)	
Pride				0.14*** (0.01)		0.67*** (0.009)
Observations	73,459	40,242	40,242	40,242	40,242	40,242
Adjusted R ²	0.526	0.178	0.198	0.710	0.608	0.616
Country $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

D Regression Results

Table D1: Full results for Tables 5 and 6 with all control variables.

Support for: Survey Rounds:	Economic Globalization								
	I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15)					IV (2022-25)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Identification	-0.09*** (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)				
Household Income	0.11*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age	-0.004*** (0.0005)	-0.003*** (0.0006)	-0.002*** (0.0006)	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.0009)	-0.003*** (0.0009)
Male	0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Education Years	0.03*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
College Degree	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
Unemployed	0.03* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Pride		-0.09*** (0.01)		0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)		0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Chauvinism			-0.24*** (0.010)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.35*** (0.01)		-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.32*** (0.03)	-0.33*** (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism					-0.03*** (0.008)				-0.05*** (0.01)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	71,211	42,306	42,306	42,306	42,306	24,521	24,521	24,521	24,521
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.20	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21

Table D2: Baseline results for main dependent variables.

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic	Immigration	IO Power	Cultural	Economic	Immigration	IO Power	Cultural
	I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15)					IV (2022-25)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Identification	0.009 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)				
Pride	0.15*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.15** (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)
Chauvinism	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.03)	-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.36*** (0.01)	-0.33*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)
Household Income	0.09*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.010)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.02 (0.02)
Age	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-3.4×10^{-6} (0.0006)	-0.002*** (0.0006)	-0.007*** (0.0009)	-0.003*** (0.0009)	-0.001 (0.0008)	-1.2×10^{-5} (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.001)
Male	0.12*** (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.009 (0.02)
Education Years	0.02*** (0.003)	0.03*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
College Degree	0.18*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)
Unemployed	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.05*** (0.02)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.02*** (0.008)	-0.02** (0.007)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	42,306	35,903	33,086	43,707	24,521	23,646	8,608	25,346
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.29	0.21	0.33	0.13	0.28

Notes: OLS model. Each nationalism variable is an index that is the latent factor (first principal component) of its related survey items and is further standardized. Respondent controls include age, gender, household income, education levels, and unemployment. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × year level. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table D3: Pooled results for specific issues of economic globalization, with covariates and interaction terms.

Support for:	Free Imports v. Protection	Foreign MNCs v. Local Firms I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15)	Foreigners' Land Ownership IV (2022-25)	Imports for Better Products	Free Imports v. Protection	Foreign MNCs v. Local Firms IV (2022-25)	Foreigners' Land Ownership
Survey Rounds:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.01)			
Pride	0.11*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.04)
Chauvinism	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.23*** (0.01)	-0.38*** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.38*** (0.04)
Household Income	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.009)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.0009 (0.0006)	-0.002** (0.0007)	-0.003*** (0.0008)	0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.003*** (0.0009)	-0.0010 (0.0008)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Male	0.18*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
Education Years	0.02*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)
College Degree	0.19*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Unemployed	0.08*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03** (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.02** (0.008)	-0.04*** (0.010)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	43,505	33,601	43,400	33,820	25,317	24,878	25,256
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.13	0.24	0.08	0.20	0.10	0.20

Notes: OLS model. Each nationalism variable is an index that is the latent factor (first principal component) of its related survey items and is further standardized. Respondent controls include age, gender, household income, education levels, and unemployment. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × year level. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

D.1 Continuous-Treatment Balancing Weights: Estimators, Selection, and Diagnostics

This appendix documents the balancing-weight procedure summarized in Section 5.4.1. Because national pride and national chauvinism are continuous rather than binary treatments, conventional propensity-score matching does not apply; I therefore estimate weights that break the association between each predisposition and the weighting covariates (household income, age, gender, years of education, college attainment, and unemployment).

I compare covariate-balancing propensity scores, entropy balancing, stable balancing weights at three tolerance levels, a kernel generalized propensity-score model, generalized boosted models, and a SuperLearner ensemble. I estimate weights both globally and separately within each country–year sample; the latter preserves the country–year composition used for identification in the baseline fixed-effects models. Energy balancing is excluded because it did not converge within available memory.

I evaluate each candidate using two diagnostics. Balance is summarized by the largest absolute weighted correlation between the continuous treatment and any weighting covariate, with values below 0.10 treated as preferred and values between 0.10 and 0.20 retained as a weaker second tier. Weight stability is summarized by the effective-sample-size (ESS) ratio, $(\sum_i w_i)^2 / (N \sum_i w_i^2)$, where values closer to one indicate less precision loss. Among methods meeting the applicable balance threshold, I select the method with the largest ESS ratio and retain up to three alternatives as robustness checks. A method that fails to converge or fails its balance diagnostics is reported and excluded rather than replaced by a default method or by uniform weights.

The diagnostics are favorable (Table D4). Globally estimated entropy-balancing weights yield maximum absolute correlations of 0.050 and ESS ratios of 0.986 for pride and 0.961 for chauvinism. Within country–year samples, stable balancing weights yield an ESS ratio of 0.990 for pride and 0.942 for chauvinism. The chauvinism weights meet the preferred balance threshold (maximum correlation = 0.097); the pride weights fall in the second tier (maximum correlation = 0.144). Thus, the within-sample pride estimates warrant more caution, although only one of the six covariates exceeds 0.10, none exceeds 0.20, and alternative weighting methods produce nearly identical estimates. Because these diagnostics summarize balance in the aggregate, they do not guarantee equally good balance within every individual country–year sample.

Table D4: Selected continuous-treatment weighting methods and diagnostics.

Scope	Treatment	Selected method	Tier	Max. Cor	ESS ratio
Global	Pride	Entropy balancing (0.05)	1	0.050	0.986
Global	Chauvinism	Entropy balancing (0.05)	1	0.050	0.961
Within country–year	Pride	Optimal weighting (0.10)	2	0.144	0.990
Within country–year	Chauvinism	Optimal weighting (0.05)	1	0.097	0.942

Notes: The maximum absolute correlation is calculated across household income, age, gender, years of education, college attainment, and unemployment. Tier 1 requires a maximum absolute correlation no greater than 0.10; Tier 2 requires a value no greater than 0.20. The effective-sample-size ratio is the weighted ESS divided by the unweighted sample size.

Table D5: Baseline models with continuous-treatment balancing weights estimated within country-year samples.

	Economic			Immigration		IO Power		Cultural	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	
Pride	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	
Chauvinism	-0.40*** (0.01)	-0.37*** (0.01)	-0.46*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)	-0.41*** (0.02)	-0.38*** (0.01)	
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.02*** (0.009)	
Pride weights	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	optweight_10	
Chauvinism weights	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	optweight_05	
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	42,306	42,306	35,903	35,903	33,086	33,086	43,707	43,707	
Adjusted R ²	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.20	0.09	0.08	0.27	0.25	

Notes: Odd-numbered columns use weights selected for national pride; even-numbered columns use weights selected for national chauvinism. All models include country-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by country-year.

Table D6: **Robustness: baseline models with globally estimated continuous-treatment balancing weights.**

	Economic		Immigration		IO Power		Cultural	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Pride	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Chauvinism	-0.40*** (0.01)	-0.38*** (0.01)	-0.45*** (0.03)	-0.43*** (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)	-0.41*** (0.02)	-0.39*** (0.01)
Pride $\times$ Chauvinism	-0.04*** (0.008)	-0.04*** (0.008)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.008)
Pride weights	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05
Chauvinism weights	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05	ebal_05
Country $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	42,306	42,306	35,903	35,903	33,086	33,086	43,707	43,707
Adjusted R ²	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.09	0.09	0.27	0.26

Notes: Odd-numbered columns use weights selected for national pride; even-numbered columns use weights selected for national chauvinism. All models include country-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by country-year.

Table D7: Robustness check: nationalism indices as mean scores. Full results for economic globalization with all control variables.

Support for: Survey Fieldwork Years:	Economic Globalization								
	1994-96; 2002-05; 2012-15					2022-25			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Identification	-0.08*** (0.009)			-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.009)				
Household Income	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.005*** (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.0009)	-0.004*** (0.0009)	-0.004*** (0.0009)
Male	0.08*** (0.009)	0.08*** (0.009)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.010)	0.10*** (0.010)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Education Years	0.03*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.009** (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
College Degree	0.19*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Unemployed	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Pride		-0.14*** (0.02)		0.07*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.05)	-0.10*** (0.03)		0.06 (0.04)	0.24*** (0.08)
Chauvinism			-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.37*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.05)		-0.32*** (0.02)	-0.34*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.06)
Pride × Chauvinism					-0.04*** (0.01)				-0.06*** (0.02)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	78,469	79,074	79,079	78,322	78,322	32,793	32,905	32,787	32,787
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.21	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.20

Notes: OLS models. Each nationalism index is constructed as the mean score of its related survey items and is further standardized. Respondent controls include age, gender, household income, education, and unemployment. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × year level. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table D8: Robustness check: nationalism indices as mean scores.

Support for Globalization: Survey Fieldwork Years:	Economic Globalization							
	1994-96; 2002-05; 2012-15				2022-25			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Identification	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.02* (0.010)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.010)				
Pride	0.19*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.11)	0.14 (0.14)	0.007 (0.11)
Chauvinism	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.08)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.40*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.51*** (0.12)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.31*** (0.10)
Household Income	0.08*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.008)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.010* (0.006)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Age	-0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.0009** (0.0005)	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.009*** (0.0008)	-0.004*** (0.0009)	-0.002** (0.0006)	5.5×10^{-5} (0.0006)	-0.0007 (0.001)
Male	0.10*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.004 (0.02)
Education Years	0.01*** (0.002)	0.03*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
College Degree	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06** (0.03)
Unemployed	0.02 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.0006 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	78,322	78,343	53,380	77,370	32,787	32,814	11,033	32,263
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.24	0.11	0.28	0.20	0.27	0.13	0.28

Notes: OLS models. Each nationalism index is constructed as the mean score of its related survey items and is further standardized. Respondent controls include age, gender, household income, education, and unemployment. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country × year level. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table D9: Robustness check: domain-specific national pride.

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)				
Pride	0.17*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Chauvinism	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.40*** (0.03)	-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.31*** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.04*** (0.010)	-0.04*** (0.008)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,957	24,953	23,264	30,925	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.27	0.28	0.12	0.30	0.21	0.39	0.17	0.32

Notes: National pride is measured using only domain-specific items asking how proud respondents are of their country's democracy, political influence, economic achievements, achievements in sports, achievements in arts and literature, history, armed forces, scientific achievements, social security system, and fair treatment of all groups.

Table D10: Robustness check: national pride excluding pride in democracy.

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)				
Pride	0.11*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.0003 (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Chauvinism	-0.32*** (0.01)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.008 (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.01 (0.007)	-0.02** (0.010)	-0.01* (0.009)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,957	24,953	23,264	30,925	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.26	0.11	0.30	0.20	0.37	0.17	0.32

Notes: National pride is measured using all standard items except the item asking how proud respondents are of their country's democracy.

Table D11: Robustness check: national pride excluding pride in economic achievements.

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)				
Pride	0.12*** (0.01)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.002 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Chauvinism	-0.33*** (0.01)	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.03)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.01* (0.007)	-0.02** (0.009)	-0.01* (0.009)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.007 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,957	24,953	23,264	30,925	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.27	0.11	0.30	0.20	0.37	0.17	0.32

Notes: National pride is measured using all standard items except the item asking how proud respondents are of their country's economic achievements.

Table D12: Robustness check: controlling for the “Membership Criteria” questions

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)				
Pride	0.13*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.15** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Chauvinism	-0.28*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.04)
Membership: Civic	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)				
Membership: Ethnic	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.02)				
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.02*** (0.008)	-0.01* (0.007)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	42,306	35,903	33,086	43,707	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.27	0.11	0.29	0.21	0.39	0.18	0.32

Table D13: Robustness check: controlling for additional covariates

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.004 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)				
Pride	0.17*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.15** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Chauvinism	-0.37*** (0.01)	-0.44*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.04)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.02* (0.009)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,957	24,953	23,264	30,925	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.27	0.27	0.12	0.30	0.21	0.39	0.18	0.32

Table D14: Robustness check: controlling for occupational features

Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.0002 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)				
Pride	0.18*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.15** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Chauvinism	-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.43*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.36*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.04)
Job Offshorability	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.0007*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0003)	0.0007** (0.0003)				
Task Routineness	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.02)				
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,374	15,874	16,501	18,993	16,691	16,137	6,136	17,309
Adjusted R ²	0.27	0.28	0.12	0.31	0.21	0.39	0.18	0.32

Table D15: Robustness check: controlling for additional covariates from the ISSP Citizenship Module.


Support for Globalization: Survey Rounds:	Economic I (1994-96); II (2002-05); III (2012-15) (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)	Economic (5)	Immigration IV (2022-25) (6)	IO Power (7)	Cultural (8)
Identification	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)				
Pride	0.11*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)
Chauvinism	-0.35*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.07)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)
Political News	0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	-0.0007 (0.02)	-0.009 (0.01)	0.01** (0.005)	0.02** (0.006)	0.03** (0.01)	0.002 (0.006)
General Trust	0.04* (0.02)	0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.11** (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)
Populism					-0.39*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.009 (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.03)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,700	4,099	4,677	4,918	24,004	23,203	8,519	24,799
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.26	0.11	0.36	0.27	0.36	0.13	0.30

Notes: Populism is the mean score of a battery of five survey items newly added to the ISSP Citizenship Module in the 2022–25 round. Political news consumption is a self-reported scale of the frequency of reading political news across all media. General trust is the mean score of two items measuring interpersonal social trust.

Table D16: Robustness check: employing population weights


Support for Globalization:	Economic (1)	Immigration (2)	IO Power (3)	Cultural (4)
Identification	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Pride	0.11*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.005 (0.02)
Chauvinism	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.01)
Pride × Chauvinism	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.01* (0.007)	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.01** (0.007)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	42,583	36,360	33,289	44,024
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.24	0.10	0.29

Figure D1: **Baseline results by country-year sample: economic globalization.**




Notes: For consistency across rounds, national identification is excluded; the specification corresponds to column (3) of Tables 5 and 6, estimated separately for each country-year sample.

Figure D2: **Baseline results by country-year sample: immigration.**




Notes: For consistency across rounds, national identification is excluded; the specification corresponds to column (3) of Tables 5 and 6, estimated separately for each country-year sample.

Figure D3: Baseline results by country-year sample: power of IOs.




Notes: For consistency across rounds, national identification is excluded; the specification corresponds to column (3) of Tables 5 and 6, estimated separately for each country-year sample.

Figure D4: **Baseline results by country-year sample: cultural globalization.**




Notes: For consistency across rounds, national identification is excluded; the specification corresponds to column (3) of Tables 5 and 6, estimated separately for each country-year sample.

Figure D5: Meta-analysis: country-level moderators of nationalism effects on globalization preferences.



Notes: Each panel displays coefficients from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the country-year-specific estimated effect of national pride or national chauvinism on globalization preferences, obtained from first-stage country-year regressions. All country-year-level economic and political characteristics are included simultaneously, with year fixed effects in all models. Points and lines represent point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Red and blue denote the effects of national chauvinism and national pride, respectively.

Figure D6: **Meta-analysis: country-level moderators of nationalism effects on globalization preferences (bivariate specification).**



Notes: Each panel displays coefficients from a bivariate OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the country-year-specific estimated effect of national pride or national chauvinism on globalization preferences, obtained from first-stage country-year regressions. Unlike the multivariate specification in Figure D5, each country-level characteristic is entered separately without controls, allowing assessment of its raw correlation with heterogeneity in nationalism effects across samples. Points and lines represent point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Red and blue denote the effects of national chauvinism and national pride, respectively.

Figure D7: **Robustness check: estimating interaction effects flexibly using *interflex* (latent-factor indices).**





Figure D8: **Robustness check: estimating interaction effects flexibly using *interflex* (mean-score indices).**



E BES Data and Results

E.1 Measurement with BES Data

I also create separate measures for national identification, national pride, and national chauvinism using BES questions. Compared to the ISSP National Identity Module, the BES is not specifically designed to examine people's national identity and attitudes toward global affairs, so it contains fewer questions about nationalism, making dimension reduction less of a challenge. While many waves include survey questions that measure one or two dimensions of nationalism, only Waves 7, 9, and 10 contain enough questions to allow for separate measures of all three dimensions.

Thus, I use only Waves 7, 9, and 10. Table E1 lists the survey questions from these waves used to measure the nationalism dimensions and globalization preferences. Only one question (about *Britishness*) is available to measure national identification. In contrast, both national pride and national chauvinism are measured using multiple survey questions. A key distinction between the national pride and national chauvinism questions is that the latter explicitly prompt respondents to compare the UK to other countries. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) shows that, for both national pride and national chauvinism, all of the corresponding questions — two for pride and four for chauvinism — load onto the same latent dimension. I use these questions to construct both latent-factor-based and mean-based measures of national pride and national chauvinism.

Table E1: Measuring nationalism dimensions and globalization preferences using BES data

Variable	Survey Question	Wave
Identification	Subjective Britishness vs. Englishness/Scottishness/Welshness and Europeanness	1-4, 7-17, 20-23, 25-27
Pride	Some things about Britain make me ashamed to be British	7, 9, 10
Pride	Less proud of Britain than I would like to be	7, 9, 10
Chauvinism	Britain has a lot to learn from other countries	7, 9, 10
Chauvinism	I'd rather be a British citizen than of any other country	7, 9, 10
Chauvinism	People in Britain are too ready to criticise their country	7, 9, 10
Chauvinism	A better world if countries were like Britain	7, 9, 10
Trade	Is free trade with Europe good or bad for Britain: (<i>Trade with Europe</i>)	7, 10
Immigration	Should the UK allow many more or fewer immigrants to come to live here?	7, 9, 10
IO	How did (would) you vote in the (another) EU referendum? (<i>Stay in EU</i>)	7, 9, 10

Measuring Globalization Preferences with BES Data In BES Waves 7, 9, and 10, most questions about globalization focus specifically on the EU and Brexit. As shown in Table E1, I identify one measure of trade support based on a question about the benefits of trade with Europe for the UK (*Trade with Europe*). To proxy support for IOs, I use a question that asks respondents how they voted in a past EU referendum or would vote in a future hypothetical one (*Stay in EU*). To measure support for immigration, I use a question that addresses immigration in general rather than focusing specifically on intra-EU immigrants or EU immigration policy. Although the regional focus of the trade- and EU-related questions requires caution when comparing results across different dependent variables, it also provides an opportunity to test my theory in a specific regional context.

E.2 Distinguishing National Pride from National Chauvinism: BES

Table E2: **Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism in BES: By wave**

Panel A: Factor-Based Measures		National Chauvinism		
		Above Sample Mean	Below Sample Mean	
National Pride	Above Sample Mean	Wave 7:	32.1%	13.5%
		Wave 9:	31.3%	13.2%
		Wave 10:	29.9%	16.0%
	Below Sample Mean	Wave 7:	24.3%	30.1%
		Wave 9:	20.6%	34.9%
		Wave 10:	19.0%	35.1%
Panel B: Mean-Based Measures				
National Pride	Above Sample Mean	Wave 7	35.1%	10.0%
		Wave 9	36.5%	8.0%
		Wave 10	36.2%	9.3%
	Below Sample Mean	Wave 7	17.1%	37.8%
		Wave 9	16.8%	38.6%
		Wave 10	16.4%	38.1%

Table E3: **Sample distributions of national pride and national chauvinism in BES: By region**

Region	% Both Above Mean	% Both Below Mean	% Above-Mean Pride, Below-Mean Chauvinism	% Below-Mean Pride Above-Mean Chauvinism
North West	31.8%	31.4%	14.6%	22.2%
Wales	29.3%	36.4%	14.4%	19.9%
Scotland	32.7%	35.4%	7%	24.9%
Yorkshire and the Humber	31.3%	31.4%	13.6%	23.6%
South East	32.7%	29.2%	14.6%	23.5%
South West	32.7%	32.1%	13.3%	21.9%
East of England	33.1%	28.9%	13.2%	24.8%
East Midlands	33.5%	28.3%	14.6%	23.7%
North East	34.6%	28.9%	13.5%	23%
West Midlands	34.7%	26.8%	14.2%	24.3%
London	28.9%	35.6%	17%	18.6%

Notes: Mean-based measures of national pride and national chauvinism are used here.

E.3 Baseline Results with BES

Table E5 presents the results of estimating model (1) using the BES data. I control for respondent characteristics (age, gender, personal income, education level, employment status, left-right ideology score, and white ethnicity) and include region and wave fixed effects. Since incorporating all covariates substantially reduces the sample size, I first estimate the model without personal characteristics in columns (1), (3), and (5).

Table E4: **Distinct demographic correlates: BES data**

	Identification	Pride	Chauvinism	Identification	Pride	Chauvinism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.006*** (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.007*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0003)	-6.9×10^{-5} (0.0002)	0.005*** (0.0004)
Male	-0.02* (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.03*** (0.009)	-0.02** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.03*** (0.009)
Household Income	0.02*** (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.04*** (0.008)	0.02*** (0.006)	0.01*** (0.005)	-0.04*** (0.006)
College Degree	0.0002 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.008)	-0.09*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.0001 (0.008)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Education Years	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.03*** (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	4×10^{-5} (0.001)	-0.03*** (0.002)
Unemployed	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.01** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.01)
Identification					0.12*** (0.009)	0.14*** (0.008)
Chauvinism				0.13*** (0.008)	0.23*** (0.007)	
Pride				0.27*** (0.02)		0.60*** (0.01)
Observations	79,346	79,918	79,573	78,855	78,855	78,855
Adjusted R ²	0.525	0.427	0.174	0.563	0.538	0.322
Country $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table E5: **Baseline results with BES Waves 7, 9, 10**

Dep. Var. Support for:	Trade with Europe		Immigration		Stay in EU	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Identification	0.005** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.008)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Pride	0.10*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.43*** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Chauvinism	-0.24*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)	-2.3*** (0.12)	-1.9*** (0.09)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.03)
Pride $\times$ Chauvinism	-0.02*** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.002)	-0.27*** (0.009)	-0.21*** (0.004)	-0.05*** (0.004)	-0.04*** (0.003)
Covariates		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	49,343	39,648	53,740	43,328	55,203	44,512
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.064	0.193	0.276	0.128	0.192
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The latent-factor-based nationalism measures are standardized to ease interpretations. Each dependent variable is based on a single survey question, so they are all discrete variables and are not standardized. Covariates include the following respondent demographic characteristics: Personal income, age, gender, education level, full-time working or studying status, whiteness, and left-right ideology. Region refers to the Government Office Regions of England, in addition to Wales and Scotland. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

F Evidence from Two Original Surveys

The first survey was fielded in March 2024 ($n = 789$) through the Harvard Digital Laboratory for the Social Sciences; the second in May 2026 ($n = 350$) through Prolific, on a nationally representative sample. National pride and national chauvinism are measured with scales adapted from the ISSP National Identity module. Social dominance orientation is measured with the standard short battery. The 2026 survey additionally measures zero-sum thinking in two forms: as a general belief about social and economic life, and as a belief specific to international trade.

In Table F2, the row labelled Chauvinism – Pride reports the difference between the two coefficients with a standard error computed from the coefficient covariance matrix. This is the quantity the theory speaks to: because the two predispositions correlate at $r = 0.73$, each marginal coefficient depends on what else is in the model, whereas the claim being tested is that the two differ.

Table F1: **Nationalist predispositions and social dominance orientation: 2024 survey.**

DV:	Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Identification	0.09*			-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)			(0.05)	(0.05)
Pride		0.10**		-0.15***	-0.16***
		(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Chauvinism			0.52***	0.63***	0.61***
			(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Pride $\times$ Chauvinism					-0.05
					(0.04)
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	790	789	789	789	789
Adjusted R ²	0.13	0.13	0.20	0.21	0.21

Notes: OLS models, $n = 789$. Respondent controls include age, gender, race, personal income, college degree, high school degree, employment, and ideology. Column (2) shows that national pride is weakly positively associated with SDO on its own; Column (4) shows that the association reverses once national chauvinism is held constant. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

F.1 Right-Wing Authoritarianism in the BES

Right-wing authoritarianism is not one of the microfoundations my theory invokes, so it is reported here rather than in the main text. It is closely related to SDO, however, and the British panel measures it in the same waves as the nationalism items, so it offers a second and much larger test of whether the two predispositions come apart. They do, and more sharply than for SDO: national pride enters significantly negatively once chauvinism is held constant, rather than merely null.

F.2 Key Survey Instruments

Nationalism items are adapted from the ISSP National Identity module.

Social Dominance Orientation:

- Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
- It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
- Group equality should not be our primary goal.
- We should not push for group equality.

Table F2: **Nationalist predispositions, social dominance orientation, and zero-sum thinking: 2026 survey.**

DV:	SDO		Zero-Sum (General)	Zero-Sum (Trade)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pride	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Chauvinism	0.60*** (0.06)	0.53*** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Chauvinism – Pride	0.66*** (0.12)	0.61*** (0.12)	-0.04 (0.15)	0.18 (0.15)
Respondent Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	350	349	349	349
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.35	0.07	0.01

Notes: OLS models, $n = 350$. All variables standardized. Respondent controls include age, gender, education, household income, college degree, and party identification. The zero-sum trade measure is a contrast score, constructed as the perceived benefit of trade to the United States minus its perceived benefit to trading partners, so that higher values indicate a belief that trade advantages partners at American expense. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table F3: **Nationalist predispositions and right-wing authoritarianism: BES Internet Panels.**

	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	
	Wave 7 (1)	Wave 10 (2)
National pride	-0.18*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)
National chauvinism	0.34*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.01)
Chauvinism – Pride	0.52*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)
Observations	18,362	15,969

Notes: Both predispositions enter jointly, alongside national identification, personal income, age, gender, education, and left–right ideology. Authoritarianism is measured in the same wave as the nationalism items. All variables are standardized within sample; standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Dropping the education and ideology controls, which are missing for roughly a quarter of respondents, raises the contrasts to 0.73 and 0.69 and adds a third replication in wave 9 (0.62); ideology absorbs part of the association because it is itself correlated with both chauvinism and authoritarianism. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Zero-Sum Thinking (General):

- In life, one person’s gain is usually another person’s loss.
- If someone gets richer, it means that somebody else gets poorer.

Zero-Sum Thinking (Trade):

- In your opinion, does international trade help or hurt the number of jobs available in the United States?
- In your opinion, does international trade help or hurt the number of jobs available in countries that trade with the United States?